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one evening back In the w1nter of 1780-1781, the Unlve 
s1t~ ot KOenlglberg's molt enl1ghtened protellor leaned baok trom 
the 11ttle <lelk 1n hi. pr1Tate Itud1 andsm11ed. At last, there 
1t wall 81. manuscr1pt ot the Crltlsue ~ l!£! Rea.on read1 tor 
tbe prlnter' AS be lat thera aUllng over the alght or more ,.ear, 
ot work tbat bad gona 1nto thl. book, Immanuel IAnt was wall 
aware ot the Intluence It mlght eaall7 bave--ln tact, probably 
would bave.Be knew tbat the l1te or death ot the old metapbJ"-
108 would depend on hi8 publlshing this book. Why' should he 
hesitate to klll luch a Dothersome 8elt-contrad1ctor~ Becuba' 
Thls was tbe war to put an eDd to all indemonstrable assertion •• 
So he sent his manu,cr1pt to the printer. The tlrst 
ed1tlon appeared. 
edltlon tollowed. 
It was not too well recelved, but a second 
Slowl,. Intere.t 1n Prote •• or Kant began to 
grow and the tempo ot the prlnt1ngs quickened. Soon French and 
Eng11.h presses .ere rela~1ng to tore1gn reader. his ana1781. ot 
human rea.onlng. All the otMr major languages began tel11ng 
Kant'l .. 18age .0 ettectuallY that gradually a ne" race of men 
began to appear. 
1 
2 
Thi. race of man •• e.d decent and godl:1 enough. What 
if they could not prove the existenoe 01' God, the treedom of the 
wl11, or the immortality 01' the soult They could alw.7. just 
-trust· 1n them. Granted tbat there exlsted tor them. ·oontI-
nental dlvldeD between speoulatlve and praotical thougbt, stl11 
It waa because of this spllt that they were all autonomous. 
Sinoe they were now the lawmakers tor their own aotlons, the,-
were reaponsible to no ultImate authorlt.J above or beyond the~ 
selves. What could give men more dignlt7 than thla auton0mJ ot 
the ira , 
So the intelleotual progeny of Kant bas multiplIed 
untl1 toda1, almost one hundred and titt1 ,.ears after his death. 
This race of men and their deeds g1ve tar more e vldence trom 
whioh to judse the true import 01' the Or! t19\\8 01' Pure aeaaon 
tban the atud10ua proteasor 01' Koenlg.berg enjoyed in his sllent 
stud,. tha t evening long ago. 
01' course Kant r s influenoe bas been auamented b1 mat1J' 
subsequent thinker. in eyery field who consoiously or unconscious 
11 have used the lImitations and dogma 01' his ~rlti9.u. as thelr 
starting points. Yet Kant remains the saminal point1 trom 
Which--even more tban trom neacartes--modern pbllosopbJ has been 
1 01'. P. J. Thonnard, Precis d'Hi8tO!N de la Phil0.0-
iiie, Par18, 1946, 449 and 618. Cr. allo :toaap! 1."""te'1gh'Eon, 
nt, the Seminal Thinker,· Immanuel I'aDt, 1'1M-1924, Chioago 
1925, 85-86. .-
3 
shot through with subjectivism, modern morals with irrationalism, 
and modern living with its slavery to misconceived freedom. To 
bring out tne real significance of Kant's work same development 
of these ideas seems necessary~ 
Since the time of Kant one can truly question whether 
there has developed any philosophy whlch did ambrace all the 
reality that a philosophioal system can embraoe. Hegelts Ideal-
Ism, oomte t • Posit1v1sm, Mill's Utilitarianism, James's Pragmat-
ism, and Dewey's Instrumentalism--all aooept, at least 1mpllcit-
ly, Kant's reply to bt. central problem about synthetio judgment • 
.! Erior1. They e1 ther build upon his reply or reject the cOUlua-
quenee. that R4nt or othsrs drew from 1t while still clinging to 
the fundamental posit1ons. 
There 1s ample evidence of tba .ubjectivism that the 
"Oopernican Revolution" of IAnt has breathed 1nto modern philoso-
phy. !lost of tad .. ,.'. philosopher. rarel,. go beyond the problem 
ot knowledge, belng locked thereby wlthin the subjective s.lt. 
Then there are thinkers who approve as worth while only tho •• 
idea. whioh are advs.ntag&ous to themselv... A man of thla type 
will admit that there may be an Arohiteot of the unlv81"., but 
win Rot go on to say that there 1s a God, simply becauae h8 •••• 
no profit tor hlma.lt in such an a •• ertion.2 Even the watohword 
a ct. for example, W. F. G. Swann, ~ Arohit.cture ot 
the Universe ..... York, 1934, 394-395. Swannt~nEng i. 'E7Pr-
oal 01 maD ra mat11ts in both the t. 
ot current philosophy, "It works'" always has the connotation, at 
least, of working tor me. 
-
In the field ot religion this subjectivism show. it •• lf 
1n indifterence eIther to any particular religious denomination 
or to the wr~le idea of religion 1n general.3 Could relizion 
have been branded so easily and accepted so widely as the "opiate 
ef the people" if someone even before Hegel had not first divorcee 
from the metaphysical baai. of religion that sYltem of maralit,. 
which people know is no opiate' And even 1n morals there 1s the 
odd spectacle today of man conceIving of the mora117 good and 
bad--lf the,. admit they can be distinguished at a11--&8 merel,. 
subjective values, and foroing themaelves to try observing the 
shell ot a moral l1fe without the motIVation of the love of God, 
hope of reward, or fear ot punishment, tor Kant bad dlscarded 
such motivation aa unethical 1n the Critigue !! Practioal Reason. 
Instead, manJ moderns are trying to hobble along on the rlcketr 
crutches of reputation and self-respeot alone. 
While keeping in mind the other influences contributing 
to the stark reality which is todayls world, one can scarcely be 
accused ot exaggeration if he g1ves the toremoat pla.ce after 
Original Sin to Immanuel ltant. .0 thinking man oan long doubt 
3 at. J. Donat, S. J.. ItMea Generalls, 1n SUJIDIIL 
PhilosoRMa. Ohristian .... Edltl0 Quaria. IDnlbrUCk, 19Sa, Xle 
ana 1"!X. • 
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the real significance and tho collosal impact of tae answer given 
by the man trom Koenigsberg to his simple starting questIon, "How 
are synthetie judgments ~ ~riorl possible?" 
It 1s preoisely beoause the reality of teda,.'. worle! 
1s bleak, that more critical eyes are turning daily not only to 
Kant 'a starting question, but alao and especially to th€ 511PPO-
sltlons 111ns beneath that questIon. For they see only too 
clearly that practIcally all the activities of modern non-achola. 
tic philosophy are dependant on Kant's question and its supposi-
tions ~n one waT or other, either as development. of or reactions 
to Kant's doctrine. 
For ~xample, two important luppositions ot Kant are 
that synthetic judgments ~ 21'101'1 actually exlat,4 and that ~ 
2r10r1 forma are tbe only way of explaining them.! The question 
today is: Do theae suppositions rest on grounds tbat are them-
selves solid' Or, perhaps, did ltant take for granted the ground. 
themselves of these suppositions? Could these grounds beneath 
Kant'. own suppcslt10ns perhaps have been the fundamental prine1 .. 
plea "hi oh everyone acoepted as true and unassailable in ltUlt'1 
day, but which further investIgation and experience have shown to 
• Immanuel Kant, critique of Pure Reason, trans. 3. M. 
D. MeiklejobJJ, 'l'ba Everyman'. tfSraryedl\Ion, lew York, 1946, 
32. In the tol.lowing page., this work and this edition w11l be 
referred to .imply as the Critique. 




be highly questionable' 
It should not be surprising, theretore, that tbe pur-
pose of the pre.ent tbesis i8 to oa~ on a little of tnl. 
inv.stigatlon ot Iant's suppositlons. Thus the tblsis w1ll at-
tempt, in partloular, to explain and to evaluate two of the 
basic reasonl whloh led Immanuel ltant to consider bt8 !. prior! 
torma .s OeOeI8&1'1_ The two basl0 reasons to be treated he" 
are his divislon ot judgment. and his negl •• ' of abstractIon al 
manttested by his po.lting the ·Copernloan Revolution." 
The are. of this inveltigation is limited to the 
Pretaces and Introduction to Kant's Oritlque, .!! Pure aeasog_ 
Kant's seoon4 edition 11 oholen beoau.e It embodies hi. own 
addltlona, alterationl, and 01118.1008. Moreover, the thr •• 
Engllsh translatore have u.ed this .41tloo .... t.o of the. baslng 
their entire work upon it. Of the Englleh tranelat10nl, that 
ot J. D. If •• e1kl.john, a8 pr1nt.4 1n the E't'.r7MU1's Llbra1"1 
ed1tlon, New York, 1966, has been sel.cted b.cause of it. 
tide11ty to lant, Its readablllt7, and Its wld. aoc.eslbill~ 
tbrough this modern .di tlon. In the Introduotion to thil edi-
tlon A. D. L1ndea,. disculsel the relative value ot Kant fS two 
.41 t10na. !he pre •• nt thelis II1gbt bave be.n baSH on any ot 
the thr.e English Translation. without aOJ slgnlfioant chaage.6 
6 The varylng merlts of these Inglish translatlons ot 
Kant are taken up by I. X. SDdth in hls translatlon of tbe 
, 
What type ot approach shall be made in this oonsldera-
tion ot lant's div1aion ot judgments and negleot of abstraction? 
The psyohological approach aeems .ell suited to this purpose. 
Thus in the flrst part, the philosophioal thougbt and examples 
that set the stas- tor Kant shall be propounded, along with a 
study of ltant billl8eU before he solvea the problem tbat oon-
fronted him. In the second part ot the tbe.i., an attempt shall 
be made to und.r.tand exaotly what Kant meant by the pbra.e 
"synthetic Judgments I.' Rrtorl,· and by tbe reasonJ he adduces to 
show tbe neoelsi ty of his !. :.erior; torm.. The tbird and last 
division containa the oritlcal part ot the thells wblch aima at 
anawering Whether Kant's ~ pr12r1 forms are striot11 nece.sary 
or even reasonably adapted to a theory of cognition. 
The last subjeot of these introduotoX'y remarks i. the 
method to be used 1n pursuing the objectlve ot this tbesll. 
S1nce three main elementl in this 1nveltigation of Kantfa suppe-
s1 tiona will bel the exposition of what Kant baa sald on the 
problem, the analysis ot wbat Kant meant, and tinally, the criti-
olsm 01' hi s reasons for the solution, a few words on the method 
used with eaoh of tbese elements s.ems appropriate. 
Critisue ot Pure Reason, London, 1929, v. Moreover, in order to 
dIscover liiW LiItlii. lpatoh-work lt theOl'7 atfeota Kant'l Pretaoes 
and Introduct10n, ct. H. It. Smlth, A commentaFe to Kant., 
.critiju. of Pure Reason,' London, rV!tS, !t:I~ -r. "3. 'aton" 
attemp' at"'fi.ifrns eEla theory 1s oontained 1n hi. Kant " 
MetaRBIsio of .,rlenee, He. 'YW,' k, 1936, I, 3'7-43. ,au,... 
references are !nIB fIrst vol 
8 
Regarding the expos1tion ot !aftt, both Norman !amp 
Smith 1n his ~ OOIU1'l18l1U!7 !2. Ksnt t. 'Pnt1QS1 .e! f!!Jte H.,on l 
and Fr. Joeeph 14ar'chal, S. J., 1n hi. Ie! Po&nt .!t DiEart !!. 11. 
M!taW"SM have made 8011e pert1nent ltat&_nt.. For example, 
N. it. Smith e"1a that 
cttation or .10816 passage. 18 quite lnoonolullve. lot 
onl.J' _I' all _. relevant pa •• as •• be oollated. ihQ' 
_at be Interpreted in the l1sht ot an b1ltor1cal W1dez--
ataarU.ras ot the yaztioua .tas .. in ltaDt t • de'9'8lo~nt. 
flee DlUat alae be prepare4 to tlnd that on certain _in 
que,tioJ'll 1taIlt be,ltate. beh.en oppo," p081tlolll, ad 
that be noWhaN det1nitelY eOJllR1tl h1 .. elt to aD,. quite 
tinal e;apreaalon or vi ... '
a.ltd., multiple oltat1oae, wheNYe it 11 ~'lib1e, the lnve.t1-
gator muat exerola. pat1enoe 1t be talla to tind oonolu.l.o an-
a.er.. IaDt _,. quite .1mp17 not bave tormed an,. oomp1etol,. 
.atl.tactorJ aD ••• r. 
'1'. Mar'cbal t.ll. tboae interested in Jtallt1an .tud1., 
to avold two eatn ... 1n the1..- "IUII18. ot Kant t. thought.8 !he 
one eatr_ 1.a to wr1te a Yfi'I!'I brlet, clear, and attnctl .. 'u.-
matlon. Tb8 ahor'ooming. ot thi. approach are tbat 1 t 18 "I."" 
11_1,. '0 be lION of IUl ln8uttlclentl,. guaranteed 1rlteZ'Ps-etatlO1l 
thaD a taithful ~8_ ad tbat lt 11111 baYe alteH. ese •• elvel,. 
th. Vue hi,torloal obaraoter ot 1aD"e wr1t1nse. The obI' 
7 Smltb., ,,_tau. uiv. 
, 8 Joeeph 1IaJ.'6cbal, S. J •• ldl Point de 2~f.t .a.t. la ~.ta2!\1alg,uo, trolaie. ad1t1on, Parla, lR:&, nI,~ r 
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extreme is to launch out upon a very .labol"lLte, detal1ed, and 
complicated OPUS on Kant. Evidenoing this extreme are 
Vaihing.rla long, uncompleted work and the three thick tom •• ot 
Vleeachauwer. It the present the.ia incline. more to the tirst 
extreme, let the limitations of the author, of time, and ot 
theaia regulations b. sought a8 an explanation. 
When the pttoblem of anal,.aing Itant t a meaning ari,ea, 
there a.companies it the following question whioh demands a 
sincere ana.er: Is it possible to find tcant', 1!! facto meaning 
with certltude' even with high probabl1it,., Some doctrines of 
Kant mar b. tairl,. clear. Yet other. bave reoelved gra •• l,-
divergent Interpretations trom hi. most capable, or at l.ast hi. 
mos t r.nowned, commentator.. Ordlnari17, even a con,oientlou,l,. 
objectlve interpretation ot Kant ia onl,. probabl.. Theretore, 
any critlcl,. based on auch an interpretatlon can cla1m no more 
than probabl1lt,.. 
For the lake ot aimpllclt,.. dire.t interpretation ot 
Kant .e.ms preterable, .inoe tor almost anf 1nt.rpretation de-
rived rpom •• condaI7 source. opposing v1ews oan be round. Can ..... 
quentlJ, In so tar as it 1. po,slbl., the u,e ot aeoondal"7 
souro.a ln tbl, th •• la will be 1 1111 ted to a oonflrnatlon of the 
direot int.rpr.tation ot IAnt. 
When, tinally, cona1deratlon 1. given to the method ot 
crltloi.m to be emplo,-ed in tM, the.ll, one tinds the two po •• l-
10 
bilities of' intrinsic and extrInsic criticism. In the intrinsic 
critioism--as the phrase 1. understood bere--the norm uled is the 
author's consistency and hts effioacy in attaining his end. Thu. 
Kant's statements and arguments would be judged according to 
those two po1nts. 
Extrinsio criticism oonsist. either in taking a norm 
that 1s known to be valid or 10 establishing one if' it 1s deemed 
necessary t and then comparing the doctrine of Kant to this n01"Jl. 
Chapter three will be composed of both types of criticism. 
An alternate method of extrinsic criticism 1s usual17 
not very satisfactory. It consiats in collating all the testl-
monials against Kant on a certain point or in assembling all the 
zeal! on another. The only means of' insuring 80meth!ng 11k. 
objectivity in this &masling ot approval tor a oertain ldea 
would be to note down seduoual,. the purpose ot each contributing 
critic betore quoting bim. This would, quIte obviou_17, onl,. 
add to the oompleX! ty ot the task. It, tor example, variou. 
quotations from the critical parts ot N. K. Smith, H. J. Paton, 
and Edward CairCl were adduced, it could eas11y be s •• n that the 
first aims at show1ng Kant al a phenomenologut, the seoond at 
saving Kant no ... tter what the cost, aDd the last at point1ng 
out that ideal1sm il the only terminus tor anyone who aoe.pta 
Kant'. starting points. CODsequentl,., in the critical part of 
the tnesil, chapter tour, reterences to .econdary source_ will 
11 
again be used, in as tar as it is possible, for conti~matorr 
purposes, just as they are used in the analytioal part, ohapter 
three. 
CRAftER II 
HISTORICAL AID PERSONAL INFLUENCES ON ltAIT'S PROBLEM 
What are the suppositIons that led Kant to affirm tbat 
~ Erlor\ toras are necesaary' To br1ng tbase suppositions to 
light 1s the a1m of this present ebaptel'~ 
low 1t slow-mot10n studie. are highl,. helptul in bring-
ing to l1ght all the ,faetors contributIng to lome suoee •• ful ott-
taokle play in a relativel,. impol"ant tootba11 g ... , how muob 
more helpful w111 It be to _ a a ",10w-laOtlon Itud,." ot all the 
Influence. entering Into tba t aot or tho,e acts ot jUdSMnt 'b7 
which Kant ga~ an ans.er to hl. Inltial question' This second 
chapter, then, will be a slow-motlon ,tud,.. tirlt, of the 
genaral factors wblch dispo.e an,. man towards an erroneous act 
ot judgment, and second, an application ot th1s stud,. to the 
particular cale ot Immanuel Jeant to •• e whether aDJ ot the.e 
factors-los1eal or 1110g1cal, personal or traditional-can 'be 
discovered in hi. thought, and it so, wbat influence the,. tad 
on Kant', proble •• 
~ reader" personal experience and also the univer-
sal experienoe ot men eviaenee that men's judgments frequentl,. 
13 
are moved more .trongl,. b7 irrational pulls or puahe8 than b7 
the atrength ot ah.er 10g10. What are some ot these irrational 
pulls or pushe.' Probabl,. the tir8t that deservea mention is a 
man t I will when 1t 8omehow induc.. the Intelleot to make an 
as.ent. And this can happen in various wa78. Through his nll 
a man can simply tix upon something he wants, something tbat 
pleaae. hi.. When thls lulppena, hia will 18 alread,. dlspo.ed to 
pull hia mild to assent because ot the pleasure he has tore-
tasted. Or the lrkaomene.s ot auspending judgment and ted1ousl,. 
wai ting tor mora 11ght on the question _,. goad his w111 on to 
demand an,. decision from the intelleot so long as aome deol.10n 
is made. Finall,., a les-man attitude may have habituated hia 
will to let the intenect glve far too eaa,. an usent. 
Bealdes these Inordinate dlspoaltions of the wl11, 
there are other taotors inclining to error. 'l'bere 1s an unrulJ' 
iDaaginatlon tbat exaggerates and di.tort. tacts. Long rears ot 
experlenoe taught '1'ere.a of Avila to brand this te .. ing souroe 
ot error a8 "tbe madman of the hou ••• " Moreover, there are a 
mants moods and temperament that can make him too eager or too 
slUggish In givlng a •• ent. Again, there 1s that .trollg in-
ollnation to be sceptical towards anything not oontlrmed by 
immedlate .. n.. .~perl.noe. 
In the lot.11eot It •• lt tbere are man,. oooa.lon. tor 
error. First there 1s the natural 11m1tatlon or man', in-
14 
tellect. This taot is attested to mOlt atrongly by tne works of 
the truly brilliant men 01' our race. All the very dltt.ren~ 
approaohe. to rea11',. propounded by Plato, Ariltotle, Augultlne, 
Aquinas, Descartea, Kant, Hegel, and Berg.on-·to speak on17 of 
We.tern thought--are proof ot this natural lim1tation ot man'a 
power for knowing rea11t1_ Again, a judgment oan be made wi thou~ 
focusing • ufticl.n~ at tentlon on the problem. Frequent11 error 
oreepa into a man's thinking beoau.e he is untaml11ar with tho'e 
basl. aoi.nc.s tba t would keep bis thought in line _ An ignorance 
01' metaphysica, of logic, and e.,en of h1stol'1 caD lead to small 
errors whlch in the elld grow qulte co.tl,., becau •• all the other 
discipline. deper:d on these funcSamental Icience •• 
Th. tlnal factor within the tntellect di8posing to 
error i. wbat might be called the direotly logical inflUence 
tbat leads the mind a,tray_ This embrace. all the mind'. prevlou 
judgmentl-thole "pre.judgments" or tf pre judice8·--which a,. be 
insufficiently grounded but Which are uled nonethel.a. to .upport 
realoning. Obviousl,. all con.equent reasoning can have no great-
er worth than tbe origlnal "prejudice. ttl 
Although all the.e posslble interior lource. of error 
•• e. diaheart.ning enough to any enthusiastic I.eker for truth, 
1 Far a detalled study of tbe nature and operation of 
"RreJudlce· ot. John Henry lewman's The Present P08ition of 
Cathe>llos' !!l Ensland, London, 1918, B'1 .. BI. -
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it would be gross carel.lsness to leave unmentioned thoa. ractore 
outaide a man which can move him to error. Such element. are 
thoae subtle, irreeiatible things like the apirit ot one'. times, 
or the example of othere, or the preJudloes ot one's tellow work-
ers. Thase move almoat imperceptibly, but with great torce. 
Atter this brief aurvey of tne general occasiona of 
error, the ground 8eems somewbat prepared tor an applicatIon to 
Immanuel limt in ordal'" to di.cover it anT. and how many, ot 
thea. ocoasions may" bave been present dur1ng his serious study 
ot the poss1bility of synthetic Judgments a Eriori. Fortunately, 
there i8 not mueh need of tear1ng a notewortbJ distortion of 
Kant • a thinking whioh might have ari8 en trom too playful an 
imagInation or trom thoae vacillatIng moods of triumphant dil. 
00"8l'J and wearied trultration. For Kant was a deep, bard, 
patient thinker who was careful to retrace the stepi of hi, 
thought.2 
But undoubtedly other 1nfluence. both 10g10al and non-
10g1cal were tugging at Kant'. mind. To present the reader with 
a clear all-embracing v1ew of' theae lnau.ncea, firat they' wlU 
be merely catalogued, and tben a more detailed atudy ot each in-
tluence w111 tollow. Dur.t.ng the detailed study of the.e 1nflu-
Also cf. 
16 
ences an attempt will be made to point out two things: (1) that 
this influence actually affected Kant's thinking, and (2) in what 
direction it tended to turn that thinking. 
The historioaland personal influences upon lant" 
decision regarding the necessity or A priori forms may be divided 
into non-logical and loginal influences. Some of the non-logical 
-
influences came from wi thout and some from within, that is, some 
of his own oharaoter traits. Thole non-).ogica,l influence. from 
without can be divided into the spirit of Kant's times, which 
consisted ot libera11.m. laioism, soientism, and pietism, and 
into the example of Kant's predecessors. the rationalist., tbe 
British moralists, and especially Hume. The non-logioal intlu-
ence. working from within were his own genius, hie exalted e.t.e. 
of his own accomplishments, hi. impatienoe with oontradiotions, 
his carelessness wi th terminology, and his lack ot familial"it)" 
with much of the b1ator,y of philosophy. 
On the other hand there were three ~o~lcal influenoe. 
already accepted by Kant and thus direoting his reflection dur-
ing his search for the h2! of synthetic ju4gment s !. prior1. one 
ot tha,e 10g1cal influence, bad been tashioned by Kant" prede. 
celsora. Thia flpre-judgment" had certain oocasions and proroqui-
sit. condition. which dispo.ed his predece.sors' minda toward 
thia universally held conclusion. The oommon oco&s10n, were 
found in Occam's nominalism and Deacarte.'. subjeotivism. one or 
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the prerequisite oonditions was an excessive diohotomy between 
soul and bodl, whioh the oontinental rationalists took c~e ot 
empbasizing, while the stress of the B:rt1tlsh &mp1rloists tell on 
the til:l%'e.e following ootldltlons t (1) a s,oparatlon of :::ooidents 
trom substanoe, beoause in tbe knowing prooess man reaohes the 
appearancos, not the real substan<Ht; (~~) the atom1e, '1leorz of 
sensation: all that is known of things 1s a succession of aense 
impressions) and (3) _a .... oc_:t_d_e_n .... ~_s h1d~ ratheXt tbAn mantras' ~. 
sta.nce. 
b • 
~om these oocasions and oond1tions the mental act1vi 
ot Kant-, predecessors caueed only one conclusion to tlcrw. 
Necesa1t7 and strict universality cannot come ~om aena •• xpe~l. 
enc.. This was the ·p~3udlce· inher1ted from Kantls predeces. 
sora. 
On tho other hana the two "prejudices" fashioned by 
Kant hi.elt were (1) that Wol:ff1an me'ap~slcs was metaphysics 
simp17, aQd (2) that his own o ope rnio an Revolution was a valld 
h7Pothesl~h 
The forogoing 11st does not pretend to be exhaustive. 
It doe. plU.-port to be taotual. A llOl'e detailed studY' of es.eh 
intluence must be undertaken now to sholV tbtl pl. 1't that it pla,..a 
1n the intelleotual contlict that W&8 wac1ng tor Je~s inside 
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the acuto mind ot Koenlgabersts famed profassor.3 ~ order ot 
this stud,. w111 parallel that ot the tOl."ego1ng 118t. 
It 1s almost impossible tor a man to emanoipate hi1'lllelt' 
from t~ spirit of his age, and thus it 1s important to take into 
account the pa1't pla7ed by the spirit of the late eighteenth 
centlU'7 in .forminG Y..ant'a decision. A good hlsto:vian looking 
back upon suoh a period can oba~aeto~1z& 1t and eont~ast 1t with 
otMl:' agea.4 But it 113 01.'111 an attentive, analytical thlnke1T 
who oan so 11ft b.1mIelt above his own t1aas and the tUl'moll about 
hi. as to be appree1atival1 aware of the subtle MOvcmant, and 
tendenoles ot h1s own age. Ina tootnote of his Prefaoe to the 
:~st edition, Immanuel Kant showed ~elt to be suoh an att3n-
tive autllytlcal thinker. An70ne who 1s tardl1.ar with the ele-
menta Qompvis1ng the late eighteenth oentUl'1-those elementua ot 
independence, naturalism ott la1oism, solentlam. and plet1~-­
will find the first tlu1ee of these elements rathe):' ole8.%'l7 
3 ct. Mar'chal, ~ Point 2l. D'Rart, III, 10. 
"le cont11t a~oula1re du ~ationalisme dogmatiste et de l'emp~­
isme v1nt a se jouer flnalement, pendant una t1'en1;&1ne dlannees, 
au se1n dlune pena&$ probe et patient., r1goureuse .t 878t' .. 
a.t1que. 
Noue assisterons aux per1petles let plus marquantes de 
0& drame lntelleotuel peu banal, et nous en aaneidereran. enBult. 
de trl. pril, 1$ d'nouement. tJ 
4: ot. for example, Carlton J. Baye., A Political and 
CUltHa1 IiS.sMa ot Modern ~o;, New York, 1935', !, i§! ana ~m- . 3, or '!B:onn'aid', ".o~. a'Dltos,;." 445-450. 
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revealed in Kant's famous footnote. And it must be ramambered 
that Kant approvingly identifies himself with the spirit descr1b 
ed in this footnote. !.b1s faot brings out the actual influence 
of these elements upon him.. 
The last element, pietism, is not too obvious in this 
footnote, though there 18 no doubt that Kant was st1"ong17 influ-
enoed both by his pietistio mother and by Dr. Sohultz,S a 
preaoher of pietism. The footnote in whioh Kant describes his 
own ase tollows. 
We very etten hear oomplaints of tho shallowness of 
the present age. and of the deoay of profound soience. 
But I do not think that tbose which rest upon a .eoure 
foundation, suoh as Mathe_tics, Ph,-sioal Soience, eto., 
1n the least deserve tbis reproaoh, but that they rather 
maintain thet. ancient tame, and in tbe latter case, 
indeed, far surpass It. !be same Would be the case with 
the othal' kinds ot cognition, 1.1' theh' principles we1'$ 
but firmly established. III the abaan •• of this security, 
Indlffe~ence, doubt, and t1nall,., severe Ol'lt1a1s. are 
rather signa of a profound habit of thought;. OUr ase 1s 
the age 01' o1'itic18., to which eve17th1ng muat be subjeot-
ed. The saoredn.as of religion, and the authority ot 
legislation, are by many regarded as S1'ounds or exemption 
hom the examination of this tribunal. But, if they are 
exempted, they beoome the sub jaots 01' just suspioion, a.nd 
oannot lay alaim to sinoere respeot, Whioh 1'eason acoords 
-------:"". 
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1'he (U,t;&&ln of soionoe, the des,ire 1"01' 01"1 tioal thinking, the 
quest to remove all banters 1m;pe<llngp1"Og1'oSS, the longinS to 
SGe morality f'lrm17 estub11absd shine out in this pa.ssnse and a 
thGmea tl'¥lt "op ttoourl"'lnS Slt:hel' OJq>Uolt17 01'* between the l1nel 
throughout all 01' lWnttl Ct:t&t19UGi_ 
But 110<(1 Will these totU'l Gl.~.nt. 1'1OU1{'1 Kant'. thinkin8 
'l'hat 1$ tM ob3eot 01" this illVG.1ilp.tlon. fhaao 8leaants plq 
the .a' Sapol"1;nnt part of 411 the Influence. undergone by Kant. 
1'he,. d.tel'Ddn~ tM ena which. he .0'. cui to attain b1 hla spec-
ulation, as. wol1 o.sthe f\.'mda.ntnl ~.r in wih1ch thnt end 11 
gotng to be pUJlaued. 
It wtu. hi. devo'i.dneae to ,u,lenoe arld his deop de,h'te 
fo:t* solid moral livIng that pUt Kant upon hi. (lOUt's.. tt1a end 
dw,"I:lne; all hJ.a J'ea»s of th1nldng was to save Qftd proteot bo'h 
sclecoe and mol'alli;J--antt .. noble end It WQ. The other two 
eleMnt. 1D Kant. a elgh'cKulth aontUl'7 $A tmc.pber .... lnd.pend.nc. 
ana la101.m.-oontrolled t~ mannor in whloh Kan' would eo about 
laving mc.a1. and sclenoe. Be ~ould do his own lnd.penden~ 
thinking. Be would notbofibar ,. depelld aD tM man,. centU1"le. 
of pb1.1oooph1onl exp$r1~no. beh1t1d hi.. Uuc1l leas would he de!" .. 
t 11 dl I J' J 
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to any supposed l'ount ot revealed truth. Nor would ho seek his 
solution, even in part, from aome intervention of the super-
natural. The light of his own natlve reason was amply sUfficient 
to guide him. --With these remarks, the na.tlU'e and influenoe 01' 
the temper of Kantts t1m&s seem to be sufficiently sketohed. 
Another 1llogical influence that can play upon onels 
ndnd is the example Of others. The oonoreteness, the suggestive 
ness, perhaps, even the seeming succ •• s of the living e.x.a.rnple 
allures an assent hom the mind tar more eas117 than the thin17 
conoatenated ooherenoe ot a prolonged argwaent. And Kant bad 
betore him many 8y..amples that drew bis mna ln the direotion ot 
sOl'ltrthing 11ks !. ar1or! tOnl.S. It wl11 be suffioient to mention 
th!1ee of these examples. 
As Kant sat 1n h1s study, his eye. might eas117 have 
fallen on the tomes 01' Le1bnitz, Woltt, and the otbe~ rational-
is~s. Eere W&~e innate ldeas 10 abundanoe. Here were men who 
had gotten around the diffioulties of cognition by as1nlPle 
tea'--at least, so it was reputed. Just d.posl~ the ideas in the 
mind trom the start. Then the%'e oould be soarcely MY diffioult,. 
in having the mind come to know them. He%'e seemed to be on. 
facile W&7 out of ~tfs p~oblem. 
Besides those p%'edeoessors on the Continent there were 
many outstanding men in England who had oarved out new paths that 
oou.ld be eas,. to tollow. If one takes into aooount Kant's desae 
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to explain the synthetie judgment !. 21'io1'1 and joins 1t with. 
Kantls long aoquaintance with the works of the British MOralist. 
like Lord 3battesburr, ~anels HQtoheson, Joseph Butler, and Ad 
Smith, 1t will be readIly seen how the moral Inst1nct, the innat 
"moral aenae" ot these men seemed an alluring possibility 
the solution Kant was groping tor. 
But perhaps the strongest of all the examples lntlueno 
ins Kant was that of David BUms. There are numerous assuranoes 
ot this given by Kant himself in both the critlgu!7 and in hi. 
ProleS9men~ !! !It ~tHEe Meta2hZs12s.e Bume oontinually speaks 
of hidden springs and prinoiples ot hum.an nature to explain 
universal, neoessary oonooot1008.9 In the end what could be mol' 
close to Kant's ideas ot the categories a8 synthes1zing torms? 
Since the presen' paper does not aim at any exhaustive 
analysis of the non-logical influences enter1ng !l ext£a into 
Kant's deoision, this slow-motion study may now tocus upon the 
charaoter of Kant himself to b~1ng to l~t the predispos1tions 
within the man Which may have inclined hia one way or another to 
7 ct. ~., 27, 35. 
S Kant~ P1'ol.somena to .!:E.I. ,FUture Meta2hls1o!l, .d. 
Dr. Paul CQ1'US, Chicago, 10!!, !:lcr;-l~, ft. 
9 Ct. Dav1d Hums, An ~u1r'Y Conce!'slns !!ge!n under-
stasdius, Chioago, 1935, 43, ~ a ,~ , • 
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fix his assent oonoerning the Jlacessit:y of !. 122:'&21"1 torms of 
understanding. 
A glanoe at Kant laboring ceaselessl)" and w1th almost 
olock-like regular1ty on a problem that the majorit,. Of men D.l'e 
not eVGn aware or # Ilnd a pondeI"ing gaze that follows :rum as ,-ear 
after rear be perseveres in his toll and masterfully maintains a 
high inte:rest in lUs problem, olearly reveal. ,,,1 thout much possi-
bility of doubt that here is fts. powerful and penet1"atlng intel-
lect struggling and twisting r6100t1e8.1,. towards 1ts goal.ft10 
Here 1s an intellectual giant ot the t~st order_ Over and 
above that native brilliance and P8l'spicaoit,. charaoteristic of 
this Ddndthere are many intelleotual virtues that would help to 
ward otf et"ro~. auah virtues were Kant's unquestionable sincer-
1t 7, great patienoe, and untiring perseveranoe. Kant's 1s, 
indeed, as In.'. lrau."'chal put. it. nune pens'e probe 41'11 patient., 
l'igoureuae et s7stematique • • • une g'n1e oonscienoieux e' 
pl'esque entl~ement sympatlque.811 
But 1t must be kept in mind that e.rtl'emes usual1,. 
entail some danger., and thus tor Kant there was the dangelJ of 
an exalted esteem of his own intellectual endo"hts and acoom-
plishments. There 18, indeed, some evidence tor believing Kant 
10 Paton, ~ntfs Mstap8lsio Sf EePerlenoe, 56. 
11 filareohal, ~ Point 2.!.Depart, III, 10 ana 17. 
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sucoumbed to thla <lansex-. He doee l'Gtol' vat'y :n:-equentl,. to the 
Graatnees ot Me s.olUeveJaal'lta.la 0Qe. 3:1UlS aorOS8 p~UIStlG •• 1n 
the Cjr&t:1Sit 01'* Plro.eiomal! that a.re l"e4clO'l'lt of' an OWl'WGOn1ns 
Bolt-ootli'lden ••• 
.r:;Y.,n 1f rant bad be~n a :U"tel'uj man, h1a style \l'ould 
not bayS been in ~n7 \11th tb$ Sl'Gllt German w:rlte.ra of hi. 
period l.J.k0 a.b!11er and lIe1ne. But 8ince YlADt was D. ,r<oi'essw 
nnd Q. ph1losQphor, lx-om whom olutltr and lIbaclut$ objeotivity 
@6 expeoted. one oannot pass overw1thout mantloQ tho •• pt"l. 
sose. of Kant tb$t •• em tln'!J$d \fluh a certa1n braggadooio. 1,.. 
1.Tono:l1%llflU, Button, tU17sthat style 18 the l!IlEUl. and to the ext en' 
that his diotwn 1. thO dOGS ~nt Dill'J1t to Oenote4 as ovorlr' 
oonf1dent in hia own 4b111'1 ••• 13 
Mo:n:t60VOl'i,Somo 01' his bGs .... lmowa o~nttator. baye 
oalled itD.nt to taalit i~01" tb1a.14 OOl'l$tJquentlJ, suff101on1i 
'1'1 tnll Til q • 
justl::'loatlon aeoms at band to noto down (1 aoroo\il1hat high esteem 
of bls awn lntol1eotunl p~owess as one of tho dispositions 
al'teotlng l~'Ul'b's thou,oht. RenllstloGll1 oonnldeNa, few thinsa 
vlOuld havo been more (1Utleulb to'/! I(ant 1;0 a'l01<.1 tbtw th18 h18h 
selt-esieam. ~ tt llIUl1i be "~l'ed that an_ "Sal'S ot 
~.ntellcotual .p~lne in and a:round the U'nlveralt7, Kant oould 
not; haw tal1ed to ,..a(u)r:Jll~e 111& e>q manto.l ata:tnnt • in ocaparl-
Gon with that ot tM oon'.~o._les 1I1'h whom ht l!.ved, wo.ke4, 
a.nd cotrf'(ll*sed. 
'!he poaa1bl_ lntl11&nce ot suoh a o181'oIl11i10n sORl"Oe1J 
needs o~nt. It oouldeas111 'and to __ Kant ~r .... aUJl'e ot 
1118 own oonolU110D1, 01' a-oluotan' to __ 111vo8t18a1;10n8 ttJ.Jt 
baok into the hia1u4.,. of ph110.oplq', OJ' "von 1rked and d1l0OD.-
Oelf '" tJb$n tbs stubbol'n oon~~dl(rtl(;na 01' tho HtlQtUl.lu1s 
would no' 71eld to tho PO\'l~ of his tho~'. 
t.rh18 :Laat namea • .trect, an ~tleno. w1 th contft-
diotioM, oalls .cOl' n tno~e Cltpl101t iPOatmfU\t. III taot, Ett. 
Ma~eobal potnts out Ran'-. ditficult!es w1th the antlnotd.es, 
¥lh,lob lCont oonoidered as 1n~Bnt oontl'Atu'ct1ons in WlJ' der.1n1te 
metaph,sioa, aa the real .t~tins 1:>o1nt tl-om \lhl0h tlow$d the 
neo.llst_o,r !. Pul'tl9£& to ... 15 It 1s tN. that EArl't was h1gblJ 
U I I I j 
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sensit1ve to the many contrad1otions whioh bis keen mind oould 
spy in the arguments of Ube ratlo~a1i8ts. And in their ext~emalr 
~ Erier1 view of things and their not too suocessful attempt at 
explaining GodJs f~eedom, the true nature of sln, and many other 
Cartesian diffioultles, Kant may well have been justified when be 
treated with disgust the oontrad10tory statements of th& ration-
a11st; •• 16 
However, it takes a.n extremely patient; mind to _ke 
sure. first, that certain dootrines are truly contradiot~, and 
then, to push on to distinguish between the rea.l1,. exIsting 'h1ng 
spoken of 1n the dootr1De, and the doot~1ne ltselt whioh for some 
reason does not contol'm to the rea11ty_ Frequently lt 1s dltfl-
oult to find the ambigu1t,. of terma or the dlfterenoe of aspeot 
involved. And it Kant has not taken tbB utmoat oare in this re-
gard, surety soma of the consequent error oan be att~1buted to 
the oircumstanoes in whioh he was en.Rhed. For tew men haTe 
eyer been so oompletel,. caught and sUl'l'ounded by the prongs of a 
ph1losophioal "pincers moYement" as was Kant17_-and both pinoers 
had stemmed out of' those unbalanced half-truths ot Desoartes. 
Is thaI'S, perhaps some reason that might explain, &11 
antinomies of pure roason which awakened him from his dogmatio 
slumber. 
16 Cf. for s:r..s.mple, the Crit1que, 1, 11, 13, 36. 
17 Ct. Mareohal, .!!. Point ~ D6m;rt, V, 4:. 
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least in part, Kant.s inability to work his way out or these 
antinomies, save by having recourse to bis distinct10n between 
J2henoJ16Q! and no'Ull1en"a? A.lmost ever,. .-ead.x- of the 9rltlqu~ oom-
plains of tbe obscurity of Kant's thought and the multiple mean-
ings of the various torms. Surely nothing oould 1101'S s~r1oU817 
hinder Kant's disoerning a differenoe of aspect or an ambiguous 
use of tsPma in a 8uPPoled oontradlotlon than a oertain obsourit 
and contusion about the meaning and use of baai' definitions. 
The point of this pre.ent problem 18 not the actual 
presence of major cont~adictlon8 1n Kant.s crltliue. Thers are 
enoUih %tau int$%' ,sohotas on tbat question. But the i.sua at 
hand 1s, dHS ltant ha ... e the habit of som.et1m&s Using "'.1'7 basic 
wOl'ds in a 1008a non-scientlfio mann.er or even wlth a oonfusing 
ambigu1t 7f It 1s not necesaulrl17 a weakness or a. tault to em-
plo7 one werd in man7 dUt.rent meaning. provided the mean1ng. 
aJte kept in line and the Gontex' suffioien1;l,. ind10ate. the 
desired mea.1nth at. ~o_. Aquinas adght be 01ted M1"e a. aD 
ax.8.JGPle. In general na1tb.er friend nor toe of the Angello 
Docter bJtands him as an ob.curRntiat though be does use words 
Buoh aslntelle!,tu8, "at10, ~.ub~eo~ •• 2oiient.1a. etc •• in man7 
d1rr.~ant senaes. 
The answer to the present question 113 that Kantioften 
did not keep sufficiently distinct the various meanlngs he 
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attached to a word. Te~ 11ke experlence,18 judgment and 
8ynthesia.19 oategory or torm,20 a~e often not employed preoise17 
enough tor a soientific t~eatmen'. EVen H. J. Paton, who alma at 
saving Kant whe:t*evel' possible sa7., "I do not defend theae ca:t*e-
lessneseea ot expresaion, nor do I maintain that the oontradio. 
t10na are alwarB marelr verbal ••• w21 
Thus, the evidence gath~.d in one'. own oonscientious 
stud,. ot Kant and the weiSht Of so maar authorlties point direct-
17 to Kantts insuff10ient pl'eolaion and oare in the ue ot terml 
as maJ or reason. wh7 Kant t s ma.n'1 ant 1nOJdes X'emainea lIxuu)lvea. 
There 1s no need to point out tlteconsequences of this carelesa-
nesl wlth words, tho •• 1mportant "oltadels ot thought." 
A study ot Kant" obsourltr mar lead this investigation 
to a fifth charaoteri.t1. ot Kant's thInking, a.tao'o~ that un-
doubted17 accounts ve~ much tor hIs peoullar use of terms aDd 
hill rather nat.,.e bellet that he was i;he fUteiJ t~ v~nt1U'e Into 
suoh unchartered proble .. of the m1nd. This fifth charaoteristio 
1s Kant'. extremelJ SlIght aoquaintanoe w1th the Whole hl8t~ of 
18 Ct. Calrd, Critical Phl1oS02&, I, 237. 
19 Ct. P. CoftO'1, !Rlste91og, New York, 1917, I 
168-175 and 200. 
. . 
20 ot. Ubenes, H1!ltorl 9.! l!hl~Q.o12hl, II, 1M 
21 Ct. Paton, ~Bt'a ~etaiAi8ic !! ~r1enoe, 51. 
Mer.ove", Sud th, commenta"i' xx. sar8: 1:s a wr-er, hi {ianil 
1s the least exaol of 13.11 he great thlnk9ra." 
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philosophy. And 1£ the sp1x-1t of his times 1s cons1de~ed, a 
disdain toXt the Middle Ages or to'%' anything somewhat Catholic 1n 
tone, along w1th an exolusive interest in the "enlightened" 
period, 1s eas117 underatood.22 Alnple referenoes m1ght be made 
to this~1snoranoe of previous philosophioal endeavDr,23 but one 
01' two examples taken from the Or11;198e 1tself are necess&U7 t. 
bring this out JnCnle olelU'17. 
Regarding his question, "Are synthetio judgments A 
1'1'101'1: poss1ble?ft Kant tells 'WI 1n the Prolegomepa that "The 
principal reason 1t was not made long aso 1s that the question 
never ooow:-red to an1'bod1."24 It ma7 well be true that knt 
tast used the PB.%'tloulaP phrase, "synthetI0 judgments !. Jal"lo:r1, If 
but 1t 1s onl)" an unfamiliarity with Aristotle, with Aquinas and 
-the othel' Middle Age dootol's that could leave h1Ja with the i~ 
pres. ion that he was the til'st to investigate this 1Jype O:f 
judgment. It Kant had read, top instanoe, the 8&00nO book oZ St. 
, Thomas t 8 Conunentaa; .!?Jl J!!lt ~taP&Sie8 .!! Al"i.tot,., he would 
not have ventured such a .tate-.n1;.25 
Anotbel' instance ot Kantts ignora.nce of the histo1'7 of 
• 
as Of. Ca.1N. ,C:r1t,cal Ph1loaoJZ&, I, 69.70. 
23 From the PtT02:elo_; alone can be oited the follow1na 10c1: 3. 27, §!,'l, ~, 93. 
24 Ka1'lV, P,role"2~na., 27. 
25 Aquinas, lB. II Met., 1, nn. 275 .. 297. 
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philosophy occurs when he speaks or the ontologioal argument rot! 
the existence of God 1n the Crltliue. Be saJa 
Ph11olophe~8 have always talked of an absolute!l 
neoeSSaJ!'lbe1ng , and have nevertheless declIned tio t;ake 
£HS irau Ie ot oonceiving, whether--and how--a belng o~ 
this natve 1s even oogitable, not tQ mention that 1ts 
exls'~Qo. 1s actually demonstrable.26 
Kant would not have had to penetrate even into the ohlef work ot 
Aquinas to tind himself contradicted. It he had merel7 soanned 
the Summa TheeloSioats table of oontents, or its equivalent, be 
would have discovered that Ohapter Twelve ot the first book was 
entitled, S,uSmod,R De,¥, !. o,?bls c0i!!0scl turf, while even ear ... 
lier ,27 Kant t s eyes would have rested on the words, UtrUlfl :qeW!! 
esse !1!. d,.monstr,bil;e', where Aquinas's attamati .... alu,ny.l' 
meana that God ;1s s\U'elJ "oogitable .. " as Kant puts it. 
MoreOVer, 1n St. Thomasts famous thirteenth chapter 
ot the ..til'st book, "!2,!. Nondnlbu,~ Dei." he elaborates the ana-
logous knowledge we . ha.... of God. It should be boS'n. 1n mind I: 
too, that we are looldng at on17. one. Of Aquinas's works. Be 
had also taken up the cOlnosolb111ty or God in the SB!!! Cont~a 
Gentiles, in h1s Co~ntarl £nleter ~!~a~d~£ BeRtone.s, and 
in o the x' worb. M.o1"eovel'l besides Aquinas I: there wera mao7 
othe~ dootors and philosophers ot the "pre-enlightened- da7s--
26 Kant, Crltlgue, 347. 
27 Aquinas, 1- lB-, I, 2, 2. 
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such as Albert the Great, Dun,Scotus, Bonaventure, and Suarez--
V/ho definitely had not "declined to' take tho trouble of conceiv-
ing" this particular problem. 
Examples suoh as these might be increased by twenty 
or tlnrtYJ but again the evidence seen in a private reading of 
Kantts crl~1qU$ joined with tnese forogoing samples. points 
dec1dedlr to too small an aoque,lntanee with philosophical though 
before the "enlightenment." The possible intlueftoe of' sueh 
ignoranoe 1s man!!'.st. 
This brings to a olose the pl'esent investigat10n or 
the non-log1oal influenoes a.tleeting Kant hom w! th1n and 1\'om 
without. From wIthout Kant absorbed the spbtit of his age. He 
wanted to be an independent 'Mnleer and criti0 largely beoQuae 
of the llberalism and la1c1sm that tilled his de,.8. Becauea 01 
the sueces8 of s.lenee aad thB spread of pletlsm. be set his 8,. 
on the noble goal of saving and prote.tins both aolenoe and 
m.ox-al.. Bes1de. this spit'lt of the "enUghtened a.ge, It thel'. 
\lfere the examples of the rQtionalists wlth their lnnate idea., 
ot the BrItish MOl-all". with thoU- "moral in.tinot, It a.na 
espeo1a111 of Dav~d H'WISe with hia h1dden springs and pl'inelple8 
working unnoticed deep down in human natU)'te. All of them weX-8 a 
least road-ma.rka pointIng 1n tbe dbaOtlon of !. RJ"lo~1 r...,.. 
Prom wlthin, Kant was dlsposed and oonditioned by hi. 
own sin ••• 8 and persevering thOUght that proceeded ~om a tru17 
:S2 
gifted mind, by a oonsequent esteem ot his own work, by a certain 
impatience in the face ot real or seeming oontradiotions, by a 
oarelessness in his use of tsma, and flnally, by an unfamiliar-
ity with the hlsto:t:')' ot ph1lo.op~. 
Now that the dispositions in Kant'. intelleot and in 
his other faoulties have been examined--h1s desires, h1s blind 
spots, his 1ntelleotual temptations, his natu.al drift in viewing 
problems,--now, the living thought, the aotual philosophical 
dootrinGs which his predeoessors and Kant himself fashioned, may 
be deposited oaretull,. Itrto thIs ndnd, and the reaotion observed. 
This _ans a hi.tox-Loal study of what will be oalled the logical 
influences upon Kant, an e7..amination of some ot these presuppo-
sitions and "prejudioes lt whioh, once aooepted, logioally pre-
determined Kakl1;'s S91ut1un of the problem. 
It is an adndtted 1'ao,28 tbat one of the most fUnds.. 
rnen1ial suppositions in Kant's C,r1tique 18 the dootrlne tba~ 
absolute universality and nec.ssl t:y do not come trOlll exper:1-
eno •• 29 No d1st1nctlons are made regardlng this supposition. 
28 Cf. Smith, COnmteat.~. 56, iA>.rweg, 111storl ~. PhitOSO~~, 155 and 161, wSere Be calls this supposItIon ~tts 
"trfW-/"Dr' ~t.icloJ' J Mareohal, La Po I t de DiJaart, III, 52; F. X. 
Caloagno, S. J., PllUosoREl'a ~)J ol.utIca, laples, 193', I, 194, 
Benisnus, Brother, 1'. lJ. ~., mit: Ul'l"o.~edte, and God, 
Milwaukee, 194'1, 346, and Cot! • .,., !p1. emokoJ, tm1.-
29 Cf. C.rlt1i~e, 26, 27, 31 and 32J cf. ~olesomena, 
32, 80, and 81. 
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1'h.U8 the question immediately vise., how Sl.d whero did Kant sa' 
th.1a botlon? Bot_e an anawor oan ba given, a Slano. should 'M 
p~i.ld to the "uRal ph1J,osoph1eal ' •• nd8 bet.,e Kilni;' ~. an 
etto»' w111 ba _ae to point out the oooulcna tha' ott."ed Kant 
an oppertun!', 1:10 _ke this 81.11'p •• 11i101\. A:tiiet- 'Ms, the various 
ovndl1;1,ctls w111 'b$ revealed which were n •• d.cJ r.- 'bls supposi-
tlon and ".re fuhion •• br the Ocmtinen'al t-at101"lal1a'ba and the 
:f)tlltllh .mph-1e18',.. 'l!lo •• oondltloQI were 8. t1l'*d.7 establish-
ed bet01:'G Kant., ent.., ~cn the pb11oloph1oal 800ne, that all 
subsequent thlnldne would natual17 b. dlapQ8$4 •• ~1" .. , 
thiB one ptU!J'1ou~ oono1\18108, ne •••• i1,- an4 al$oln'. un!.-· 
"alltr do not 00_ fttOJl IGne •• ,xpol'ienoe. 
a-. lUff.halt. wlet .~tlon ot tlw ,.n_a1 philOS-
ophioal otu"Jtents bittef.it btl' h ottered beN ln tl'aulA'lon as .. 
backgl-CUDd a"4ine. wMoh ,. Tlew Kant. 
ltQnt bad 141a P1'$4.c •• ao~a. We rul,," alreadJ' studle' 
the efrol'tla' a 01'1t10a1 theor,of oopltlon attempM4 
117 rational!..'. 11M. n.eoar1; •• and Lelbnlta, or 1JJ 
8mpUlo1s1a. l1.ke Loe1m arIa Httme. fhoJ.xt an'.en weI~e m-
oomplote qd ene-aided but at lou' bad 'benetit .... 1'111108-
o~,.~l clearing ott tlw t.wain and tq pOlnt1ns outl. ~th!8 :an;~a:~r~n;a;}u::~ =. d:nt:l~ ::n;:~~:tt;n. 
Descal"'ttea .ttoo'1,..,11 oa11" attention to the poaslbl. 
a.'lvl'1 oj;' the. Ble 1n. the lmow1ns proco,. I' Lelbnltai to 
tbedrnamla. of tibe tn'ellisonOl in to~ns the tnt. 11-
81bhobj •• ,. Locke and HUM, to tbe ~obab1Ut7 of 
inl'!a_ ideas a.nd tI. the <llfts-Gulta. tblt H,., $'V¥1117 
ontolos11t10 ,...oau. .. 
nut tbe .... influenoe dld not atop lies-e. l'r.anfl" 
9.t"1_ was to a 0."&1n e,nen' pped.'end.ne4 "7 tdw I 
/~~\SToW~~ 
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oonoret. terms of the problem which was already 17in8 
on the table for his examine. tion. It has already been 
shown ••• how the natural development ot modern ph11os-
ophJ, starting trom Oocam, bad driven his doctrine baok 
into two extreme pOsitlon ....... we almos1f said, into two 
horns ot a dilemma. T,bsre wa. phenomenal empiricism 
(l!UIle) on one sldo and rationallsti. dopatlsm on the 
othel' either 1n lUOnlst10 tON (.Splnoza) or plurallstl. 
(Woltf). Fl'om eltbbr of the.e two positions the path 
towards further evolution was blooked: empiriolsm al-
wSJ8 ended up in the powerlessness of the sceptl0, 
wh11e rstiona..llsm was breaking up through internal con-
tradlctlona.30 
So lnUCh te a seneral idea of Kant's predeoessors and ot tbe 
impasse thought bad rea.bed Whan Kant entered the scen •• 
Beside. the o.~od1ng influenoe of Oocam'. nominal-
lsm,51 there was ano~el' cooasion that opened the way tor Kant's 
major supposition regarding unlversallty and n8088a1t1 in Judg-
ments_ It was Descartes'a oyer-emphasia on the sub3eoti.,. Mo1, 
whioh d1st~bed the nOl'lDAl balanoe in the trad.lt1onal theoX7 of 
knowledge and allowed po.t-Ca~eslan philosoph)' to "start tl'0111 
the mindu and then at1;u~mpt some sate exit to r&a11",_ 
Was Kant att'ette4 by this over-emphasis on the s\1'b-
jeotiYe element in the knowledge equation? Kant was eleaxa17 
1mbued with the Oa1'te.lan attitude 01' s1iart1ng trom the mind'. 
own aotlvlt,._ This Is well brought out by his basic question, 
30 Mar'chal" ~ Po1gt !!!. De2art, III, 10 .. 
31 The size of this paper prevents a thorough stud,. 
ot Oocam's lntluenoe. The reader is reterred to Mareohal, 
La Potn~.~ D$2ar~, I, 215-260. 
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which is at bottom loglcal--and with Kant, formally 10g10al. 
For him a.ll oonteo1; in the synthetic judgmants .!. 21'10'1.'1 ma7 be 
forgotten while his stud,. ls going on. However, no judgment ... 
ever given just in 1~s torm without an,. matter. Kant has thUs 
lost that r8 .. 118t sense that takes nature as it 1s fO'Wld and 
straightforwardly askS "wbat is lt1ft The aot of oognition migh' 
of its nature necessarily Imp17 two things, the knower and the 
thing mown, but tor the thinker on the oontlnem during tba lat 
eighteenth oentw:-7 the knower was the onll element tbat oounted. 
Ther. are, mPr8oevGl', explioit statements of Kant wrItten 1n the 
sa.me spirit.S2 U more evident. 1s datai.red, let 1t be remembett. 
$<1 tbat Kant had taken as one ot his starting polntuJ 10 the 
Introduction the obvious existance of pUXtel,. !. ;arlor& knowledge. 
~~t would be the influenoe of this apr1orlst10 
attitude? It presuppose. that ... the humI.ln 1nte11eo1; 18 not an 
essentially ~elat1ye faculty whose prope~ obJ.ot 1s so~ toPm 
p~oper ~o an s~ernal obJeot which determines tn. 1ntelleot to 
aot. Thus, this attitude excludes tbe ftI_beoome_the .. objeot,ft 
the "I-exerc1se-the..act1viir1-ot-the-..objact" theolT ot Thomist10 
psyoholo§. It prepare. tlw wal tor the plt'oblem of the ttbr1dge" 
when thelt's mal be no need tor suoh a proble.. Final17, 1t 
removes any emphasiS on the causal!t,. of the th1n~ known anCl th 
Uu 
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makes it diffioult to explain ho\fI necessity and strict univer-
sality oould p.;sslbly oome from sensible things. 
After this glance at the oocasions feB' Kant's basie 
supposi t ion, aocount may be taken ot the existence and influenoe 
of the vat-1cus "prejudices" which the rationalists and the 
emp1ricis'ba ... that two-told broodo:f: Descartes-had passed on to 
"alar1ft' Kant's hourI of stud,.. 
The mathemat1call;y clear d1vis1on VJh10h Descartes had 
made between soul and bod,. was 10heri ted and enhanced by bl. 
succeasors on the Oont1nent. Bet;ween sp1r1t and _tt01' 1iha"e 
was a d1chotol'q' that nothing could bridge, and thus a .t'orm1dable 
barrier blocked tbe possibility of abstract1on. ~h1s dootr1ne 
of an exeesalve separation between soul and bod7 passed down 
through the rational1st Una and wa.s absorbed, to sorae exten' a't 
least, h7 Kant.S3 It ls olear that at lea.1; in the more tandl. 
iar sect10ns of his wOl'k Kant alway. apeaks of the IH:lnaea, the 
under'standing, and the reatton (-willen his intent 1s to contl.'ta.' 
them) I as 1t 1i11.e,. were units in the_elves. He does not _k. 
the 1mpo~tant dlstinct10n between neoess~i11 oonoeiving 
£acultles as it tbe,. were substances themselves, and asserting 
that the,. aotuallr are so. 
F n 
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Although Y~nt's Transcendental Ego offers soma basis 
of unit,- ,-,hich resembles the soholastic radlcation of distinct 
faculties in one ultimate sou~ce ot immanent activity, neverthe-
less his noticeable lack ot emphaSis on the dynamic interaction 
and interdependenoe of the faoulties when man 1s produoinS one 
unified operation is quite in acco~d with the essentialistl0 
metaphysios ot his ~ationa11st predeoeaso!'s" and leaves oppor-
tunities for pseudo-diffioulties. 
lJ!h1s presupposition of an excesaive dlchotol1lJ tends to 
engender problems wbsre none really exist. Although Kant f a use 
ot the sohemata to explain the mediation necessary between senae 
and intelleotual oognition will approxlJ11atie the l'homlstl0 Wle of 
the oogitative sense, nevertheless, Kant's exaggerated ohasm 
between sensitive and intellectual oognition only oonfirms the 
rejeotion of tbe possibility of abstraction by the intelleot 
trom senae data. FOr with this aha •• ~e dlffioulty of inter-
oausality ariaes, as well as the need o£ seeking the total ex. 
planation for the un1Yersall~ and necessity found 1n ~. eriori 
judgments trom the intellect alone. 
It the Continental rationalists bad cleft a ohasm bo-
tween mind and matt~, be'ween the intelligible and the sensible 
the British emplrlciata--LOcke, Berkeley. HUme--had cut yet 
another chasm, but this time it was not in the knowe)!', but in 
the thing knov~. As this study now turns to consider the 
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British 10;.:;:1.0&1 horltaaG to Knnt, the three SUP1::ositions '.~.hich 
they bequeathed to him may be used as guideposts. They were: 
the diohotomy between pl'timary and secondary qualities, the 
atom1o theoX'y oJ' sensation, and the "h1dden pedestalft idea ot 
substance. 
The f1l:tst supposition of the empiriCist school was the 
separation in our knowing prooess ot the accidents trom the ex-
isting thing in itself, as if these acoidents Wel'e the object 
lmown. It 1s an historical .taot that the germs of this th601'7 
were sown by Descartes in h.ts plseours de la Metij.ode.M He d1 •• 
regarded secondary qualities beoause ther Gould not be clearl1 
conceived, and affirmed that eA~ension&nd ~tion were the on17 
realities in the material world. Looke developed th1. tenet 
further. He mare17 bald to a nominal essence of an unknown 
aubst~ate. Be~kel$y. who followed, managed to deny the rea11t7 
of all -.te1'1a1 objects and made knowledge ot: them depend upon 
Godt. putting them into the m1nd. Thus, all that remained for 
H\lmfJ to assart was that ~n fta.re nothing but a bundle 01' oolleo-
tion of different pel"oeptions, -.v'hich suoceed eaoh other with an 
inconceivable rapld1t7.ft35 Evidence tOl' Kant's acceptanoe ot 
this theo1'1 is found trequent17 1n the Critlq,ue and in the 
34 Ct. Thonnard, Precis 
H1stotZ £! ~ode~n Ph11os02Sl_ as. 
35 Hwne, EnguJ.r:;y, 247. 
~tHisto1~e, 612,· and Wr1~ht. 1'. ~  , 
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This emphatio division between aooidents and things-
in-themselves disposed Kant's mind to look to anything but 
abstraotion as a possible explanation for his tamous problem on 
the relation ot the mind to the thing, which he bad outlined in 
his well-known letter to Marous Rerz.57 Aooording to this 
"prejudice" the sensible accidents manl~ested in experienoe were 
known and told nothing ot the supposed substance beneath. Thus. 
, 
the propounders ot this theory should. it they wished to be 
logical, have spoken of sensing "mDtlon" and not "something mov-
Ins," or spying "redness" and not some "red thing." Kant, 
accordIngly, passes by the possibIlity of an objeot ooncretetl 
affecting the senses in suoh a way that hare and now the knower 
intentionally exist. aooording to \h18 quantity and thes~ 
various qualities of !e!! being and acts out dynamioally all 
these determinations. 
Kant was also atreated by Bume's "prejudioe" that men 
know mere17 a group of sensations rapidly suooeeding eaoh other 
36 FDr the cr~t1rue, of. 46-47, 51, 56-57, 60. Cf. 
also Paton, Ka~t.s Meta~ is C 'ot ~er1eno., 66, for a olear 
statement ofnt'. a40ep anoe-of~!s oooVrine on sensible 
qualities. For tne Prolesomena. at. 43-44, 58. 99, 109, 133. 
3' Ct. Sm1th,Commentar" 219-220, for an English 
translation ot this letter oated ~ b. 21, 1772. 
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and do not know any unaer17ing substance. This might easi1.7 be 
suspected from Y~ntl. own oonfession of Humats influenoe upon 
hImself. and from the tact that the objecta of Uumata and Kant'a 
experienoe are reall,. the sa_. Thelte 8re, moreove~. several 
passages in Kant.s works which are s1iamped with this doctr1ne.38 
One example of this dootrine -7 be oited. Knnt aa7. 
in his treatment ot t~ suooession of tima that "our apprehension 
of the manifold ot phenomena is always suooessive. The represen-
tation of parts suooeed one another."SS Such a tenet is inti-
mately bound up with the above mentioned dootr1ne 1n Which tho 
accidents are sepa.rated ~om the substanoe. The present pre-
supposition onlY' stresses that separation more and lead. to 
diffioulties, it in the knowing prooess .. n 11 to be lead by 
sense-affeoting aooidents to an intell1g1blesubatanoe. 
Another supposition of the British empirioist. that 
binders a knowledge ot substance, 1s that the acoidents hide the 
realit,. beneath them "ather than manifest it. 1'h1a dootrine waa 
popularized among philosophioal ciroles bl Locke with his ·pln-
cushion" 1dea, Dr better, his "invisible pede.tal" oonoeption ot 
substance. When l{ume imbibed this tradition, he forgot about the 
substanoe and made the acoidents the "things-known." Kant, in 
38 Kant, C,r1tlque, 144, 146, 157, 200, 436. Als. 
of. Proleso~Ba, 26. 
39 Kant, qrlt1iue, 149. 
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aooepting the dootrine of the aocidental determination in gener-
al, aooepted this teaohing, too.40 f.ne thing-in-itself is en-
tirely unknown and impenetrable for the mind. 
f.bat tbeae aocidental modifioations might manifest and 
eXhibit the insensible natures of things to the intelleot is 
another possibility soarcely taken aooount of, sinoe ultimately 
its adopt1on would mean the explioit positing of causality from 
the thing-in-itself upon t~ senses and the actualit7 of a 
strictl,. spiritual soul. Kant rejeota here yet another element 
that 1s essential to the theory of abstraotion, namely, that a 
thing's operations manifest ita manner of existenoe. 
Atter seeing Kant's mind oonditioned by all the.e 
logical influences of his predeoessors, it is not surprisins to 
find him aocepting quite natural17 tbe dootr1ne that stri.' uni-
versality and necessity do not oome ~om sen.e experien06. After 
all, was this not the one piece ot undisputed ground oommon to 
empirioist and rational1at alike? For the aake of clarit,., Kant., 
thought under the presaure of uneae 10g1cal influences 1s pre-
sented 1n the tollow1og syllogism. There oan be knowledge onl,. 
of what is giveo tormallJ in sense experience, tor the atomio 
tbee., of sensation deDanas this. But natures or easenoes which 
are needed tor an,. striotly universal and neoessary knowledge are 
not given formally 1n sens. e~~erience. Therefore, any strict17 
universal and necessary knowledge, whioh derives from nature. or 
essenoes, cannot be obtained ~om experienoe. In other words, 
strict universality and necessity point to a knowledge which has 
some other source than sense experienoe. 
Besides theae logioal influences tromwithout, there 
were at least two other important ideas that helped push Kant" 
mind onto the oourse it actual11 took. These were supPOSitions 
mostly ot his own making. A brief glance at tbese last "preju_ 
dices" is necessary to reduplicate as closely as possible all the 
stage-props and atmosphere that set the scene for Kant's decision. 
the first of Kant" own presuppositions stemmed from 
his unfamiliarity with the history ot philosophy. It consl8tea 
in too rapid a generalization. ~r Kant identitied Wolttlan 
metaphfsios with Iletaphysio.s as such. 41 Consequently, Kant 
." 
41 at. Etienne Gilson! Beins and Some Ph110S2Rhert 
Garden City, Kansas, 1949, 112-132, especlalty tID, whire al on 
ste a.ka of Wellf's influenoe tm-oughout Europe during Kant t s day: 
"To innume~able professors and students of ph11osopbJ, meta.-
phJs10s was Wolff and what Wolff had sald was metaphysios. TO 
Immanuel Kant, in pal'ttioular, it n.~.l' was to be anrthing els6, 
so that the whole arltlg.ue of ~ Reuon u.ltimately rests upon 
the assumption tbati ine ~an~~ 01 tSe metaphysio. ot Woltt 
had been the verY' bankrupto7 of metapqsios. tt 
The import ot Gl1son'. WO~d8 1s oonfLrmed and haightened 
by the interesting and enlightening oomparison which oao be made . 
between Kant.s ren»u'ks on the nature of metapil7sio. (or. C,r1t1S." 
3, 6, 11, 15, eto.) and the remarks of Aristotle and Aquinas on 
the same subJeot (ot. bk.oC of Aristotle's Me'aPRl8ioa and bk. 
II of Aquinas's aommentarzl. 
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supposed that in justly putting the S"oord tQ Viol.ftlan mota-
physics, he was destroying all p~evious scientific metaph1s1oa. 
Howavor, the tact that this essent:la11stic Wolffian metaphysios 
could not f~ive valid explanations of those antinomies whioh put 
Kant into such mental throes was no si3n that Do true ll1$taphyslcs 
lucked an e;tplanation. Welt'Clan meta;>by's1cs suffered from an 
exeeseively ~ arlor1 approach, a complete absence o~ analosy in 
the notion ot baing, and a d1sreg~d for the dynamtsm und tele. 
olo~ it1 the a.ctuality of beiugs. RO\'1.cou!d 11; arlfnllor the ~ bl ,= 
antinomies? A noteworthy effect of this identification by y~t 
of Wolttun m.etapbfs1cs with metapl:qsiea as such WflO to kelJp 
down anT 1nte1"6st or cln"1os1ty in Aristotle'. or Aquinas's works 
on metaphJs14s. 
The seoond supposlttDn of Kant'. own faShioning was 
that 1n the theory of knowledge the oonformity of the mind te 
the thing known was rr.s.tter tor hypothetical oonjecture. Whether 
the mind of man ooni'ol'lUS to th:tngsor things conforll to hi. mind 
1s not at all evident to Kant. Therefore to);" hilt. either view 
oan be treated as an hypothesis. This 1s his Whole attitude 
when he is explio1tly aettitlg up h1s eo ... oallea Copernican He-
volution.42 He looka upon his Whole Cr1tig.ue as a. mel". 
e.x.par1Juent; to establish the sounder hypothesis. He tells us, 
42 Ot. Critlg,u..e,. 11 ... 14 " 
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"Let us the:::: make the experiment whathe!> we may not be more 
successful in metaphys1cs_ it we assume that the objects must 
oonform to our cogn1t1on."43 
One thir~s can be seen affectl:Jg the e,nt1re Y..ant1an 
philosoph1 as a result of this initial hypothesis. It is that 
the :ri:ant1a.n system in all its :r-amificat1ons possesses no gt-eat. 
el" valid! ty "er !!. -than this ste.rting !l7Pothes1.a. 
This b~ings to a close the study ot man,. of tho influM 
enoes wOl'kll".Ig on Kant's mind. Some of' them ws.ra d octl'it'.!es of 
his own fashioning. Others "161'8 th0 traditional aoctl'inos of 
his philosophioal tore-tathers. Soma wero log1oal. Other 1nflu 
ances were tar more subtle, s.ealing almost unobserved into 
Kant ts hours of stud,.. Such were the temper ot bis t1aes, the 
example ot othel' thinksr., and the power ot his (JV1n real geniu-
alons with some of the weaknesses that not inrl'equent17 acoompan 
genius. 
What was the result or this ma •• ot' influenoes? How 
dld Kant reae' to tl:lia "p1nce1"-movament" of ey..oesalve emp1rie1am 
and ratlonalis.' How dld be formulate that reaotion? And what 
did be mean by 1t' bse a%'0 the quostions to bo treated 1n the 
following chapter. 
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OHAPTER III 
THE NA TORE. MEANING, AND PRO 0 F OF KANT I S PROBLEM 
Tb$ previous chapter has brought to light BOttS of ~. 
historical and personal influences upon Kant's thinking. This 
ohapter aims at analysing tbe nature, meaning, and proof of 
Kant's or1t1cal problem. 
To see olearlr the oentral problem which Kant poses in 
his Or1t&g,ue o,f rure ]1~aaoR and wh1ch he tb.ere 801ves; at leas1; 
to hi. satisfaction, 1t seems best to go t1r$t ot all to tbat 
cause which is the most fundamental 1n anr problem, tbe tinal 
cause. 
Now what was Immanuel Kant tr110g to do in b1a Critics. 
Ph1losop1:q! What was his a1m? Loold.ng at the positIve elements 
in his philosophy, one can satelJ sar that at least one of b1s 
objeotives, it not the chief one, was the saving of std,ence. 
Kant wanted to erect Bome bulwark asalnst tbe scepticis. that 
threatened to destr07 soienoe.1 Moreoyer, morals had to be 
strengthened against that quest tor pleasure whioh Kant found 
1 Cf. Kant, CrItique, 35. 
quite Ifam,pflb' Ql'O\md b.1J4. ne %latere 1;0 thla p\U;'t,poa. in hi. 
Pre.taoa to the _ .. ond '4)dlt1on whero he aa,., fl ••• abovo all, 
it {J;hG O,X*&t.ismij w111 contar en lne •• lmable benefl' on JIOr1l11t,. 
and "ollg!on.ft and "X mwst, tbarer.e, abolish kDowledge to 
l~ room tor- beliel'.'" mutt 80t bet ... h.t.raelt as hi • .tinal 
Boal the •• two ai... to aa". solon .. ant} to strengthen _"...18. 
1"hus, th01 beoa_ tbtl cause 0,[, all Of ~" ettoru. b •• 
goa1a sa,"" cU •• eotlon to h1a th1nking end pel'lM4'. hia 'f'Qrloua 
PZ1',liB!.1. 
'rlw nexil .'.p to ho oketn in oomng padua!l,. to a 
knowle4ae of th$ 01'1 t10al pst_10m, is to 8M 'fiM "'aolea t.ba1l 
mp' Itl.nt trOll aoh1eVing thel. eM.. In senoral 1m.e.. flbstaol •• 
•• a the daQS •• oua deoay ol~ "'aPh7elc8 and .,at1onaU_, 1th1ob. 
ought to have auPporMd sOianoe, tAlld the .tl'US81q ot oJ:I.PJJ:tlcl_ 
and the nat .... l sol:4mOG. againat tM 4~t;Lo a ... );'\14.10. of 
:ma1iaphJs1oa and l'atlonal.la-. 
1!bo Jl$1;aphJal0a wl~ whioh Kant waa ao,ua1nted ._ eo 
s'ban'a., falling into oontl'ad1ct1oJle QJldcould ol'llJ' be aa'f'«td, U 
at aU, b7 employing loae :o,eU! !! 1IIl1.18. as Lelbnlta d14 with. 
h1a tbeolT of p",. .... tabUshed ~ny. 1,.... ~& tiQnalu'3 Wei-'. 
ft'lt7 adept at; te.:.lng down 80_ other AI,.s.ea. but When ,_ £SIt. 
ot Cl'1t101 ••• a. (UJ,~·$.'e4 at their own ' •• 1UI, the lnoonal.1;. 
tu 11 r I IJ -'1 I,"" • 11' , 
4'1 
ancies in their doet~1nes or the arbitrariness of their starting 
points became manifest. And woe to the poor ecleotic who trled 
to plu.ck plea.sing doctx-inea tX'om. dUt.rent s:ystems' Antin0DtJ 
upon antinomf descended upon his head. 
In the opposing oamp the 8l1.P1r1eists wa~ed al'tixaongl'1. 
The~ simple $11\P1rleist prinoiple had set the l'ampal'ts of ration-
alism 1;otto%'in8, and thus they bad been only too eager to oon .... 
elude to th8 essential weakness of an:y rational ph1losopbJ. Tbe 
re8u11; was that the su.pposed17 solld speoulatlve toundationsot 
the moral order, such as freedom of the will, immol'tallt;r of the 
soul, alld the ex1stenee of God, were an1thirlg but close4 ques-
tiOns, end eon.equent17, little valid support to" morall •• 
Moreove1", the natval .eienc •• seemed to be undu17 re-
stricted in thetr phenomenal development by tbe doctrines of 
metaph1sics, the qu.en oS: the s01enoe.. The.. soteno •• 1'1.1'. 
eVG%' tindins 110re evidenoe \7hieh aee_d to show that aotions 1n 
this world were determined b., physical caus •• alone. though 
metaphysics kept teaohing the apparentlY incompatible influx of 
tre. oQuaal!t, into such a WOl"ld. The confllot 'betw •• n _ta. ... 
physic. and the na.t.al aoiencea was helsh1u~ned wuen the •• 
nat_a.1 science. toll owed D •• oart •• IS st".ess on the _oban1.m ln 
events, although metaphJs1ca insiated that they oame about tor 
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And rei alongslde all this philosophic doubt and tup-
moil Kani saw a strange spectaole. ~hsre was 10g10, standing 
sel'ene as ever. So too, mathematios, untouched bY' these 
sceptical storma. was showing progres. day by day_ And recant17 
physios had burst into a new glo1'7. thanks to the work ot Newton. 
\v-nile reg~dlng this speotaole, Kant could not help wondering wo, 
metaphysics alone was 60mB.hed in the coils ot contradiction. 
The immediate and most app~ent answer was that some-
how a very fundamental mistake had crept into metaph7sic., 
although the other solenoes, perhaps unknowlng17, had hit upon 
the t!'ue path to cer1iltude. To remove this basio 81'1'0" in meta-
phJslos, something radical had to be done--perhaps not so radical 
as an arbitrary ousting ot metapbJslcs trom the field of science, 
but at least tnere was need of an exaoting examination of all 
the starting poinis used 1n metaphysics.' 
Kant took upon himself the task of once and tor all 
otU'%'ying out this exacting examination. In the critical sp1l'1' 
oharaoteristic of his age, he could not exercise merely some 
hal~-attentive oont%'ol over the materials that entered into his 
3 ~s restriot1on is quIte clearly brought out u". 
A. D. LindsaJ in his Introduotion to the Everyman Edition of 
Kant.s crltlg,»e.2! f.Ure aeasoQ, London, 1946, xi. 
4: at. 1iareohal. Jd!. r210t .it!. RiRS .... III, 87.89, whioh 
is paraphrased here. 
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patient so:rutin7 at spaoulation. Centuries of philosophioal ex-
perience had shown that this trust was too nalve. Vias 1t no1; 
jut thIs spontaneous trust that had brought m.etaplVsIoa into 
such decadence' 
Thus, while foousing his critioal faoulties upon the 
general obstaoles to his purposes, and while oont)!asting this 
contUsion and oonflict 1n mataph;rslos with the order and harmon7 
present 1n certain ot~~ aolen •• s, Kant discovered ~qO special 
diffioulties ,n.om whioh all this contusion and contliet seemed 
to riae. These wel'e the two problems upon whose solution de-
pended the lite O!' death o:t the natl.D'al 80io1106S and metaphJsloa 
and, oon.e'luer.rb17, of raora11 t7" also. 
O~ d1ffloult,. was the tradl tional bite-ootx' of' tbe 
rationallata Who tollowed Descartes. I£ one started with the 
Ideas ln his mind, how eould he eyer be ave the,. oont'o~d wl1sb 
:ttea11 t,., Bow could there be a bridge bewHn 1118 mind and the 
thins? Kant was aWU$ ot 'his problem. at the beginning ot llls 
crltloal stud,-. as his letter to iilarcus Harz 011 .b1,;)brual'7 21, 
1772 ass~es ua.5 
, . 
5 Cf. top example,. the 1'ollowing exoerpt ot the well-
lmown letter as t2:'an81&t80 b7 Smith in his Oommentarz, 220: 
We call thus rende11 oomprehensible at least the possi-
bilItY' Olf two kinds ot lntel11gen ..... -otan intelleotWl aroh.-t5U1, on whoae intuition the things themsetves' are gx-ounde3, 
an ot an 1.ntetleot\UI !~~ "hioh derives the data of' 1. t. 
10glcal proc.aure !iom ~e sensuous intuition ot things. B~ 0 
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The second speoial d1ffioult,., whloh was stl11. ~re 
v/eighty, VIas the dl1emma that arose from Kant's ol.inging tio the 
rat10nalist prinoiple of ident1ty as the sole norm for soient1-
fio judgments, and his almost simultaneous abandoning of the 
rationalist principle that the real cause of an object and its 
suffioient reason are 1dent10al. Adhering to the l'ationa11st 
v1ewpoint, Kant said, nAll our reasoning 1s reduoed to discover-
ing the 1d60tit1 of the pred10ate with the subject elthar con_ 
s1dered 1n itself' or 1n its conneotion,n S but be parted radical-
ly hom rationa.list thinking when he decl~ed that tbe definition 
of tbe oause of an objeot lDakes it neoesstU'ilr somet,~i[es ~ls. 
than t~ objeot.7 Thus, in propositions that invol.ved a oausal 
relation, Kant could not call upon the principle of Identity to 
understanding (leaving mo~al ends out ot aocount) 1s not the 
CQuse of the obJeot tlu:tough its representations, nor is the 
object the cause of its intelleotual representations (!a .'Dall 
rea l l). Ren •• the pure ooncepts of une understanding cannot se 
B.osiraoted tram the data ot the sen ••• , nor do thar expre.s our-
oapaoitr for reoeiving representations through the senses. But, 
whil., they have the1l.t SO\1rces in the nat\U'e of the soul, tbe,. 
or1ginate there neither as the result of tine aotion of the 
ob3eot upon lt, nor as themselves producing tb$ object. 
S Immanuel Kant, "Prlncipiorum prlmorum metapbysloae 
cogn1tlonls noya dlluoldatl0," Kant's Werke, ed. G. Hartenstein, 
Leipzig, 166'1, I, 372. Ms.r~cha! attesis that this Is on, prin. 
ciple ot' rationalism wbich Kant never abandoned, ot. Mal-8ohal, 
.&!. Point .2!. De;par1i, III, 33, which 1s parapmaased here. 
7 Immanuel Kant, "Versuoh den Begrlf'f del' negativen 
Grossen in die Weltweishelt einzutUbren," Kant.s Werke, II, 104. 
Mar6ch41, Le Point de DOla1"1J,I1I" 33 calls-1;111-a remark of Kant, 
nPeu~_itre mime pr6irseeotsivG de la Ph11oaopbie critique." 
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explain the connection of subject and predicate. And yet he saw 
a real conneotion the~e between the subject and predioate, al-
though he oould not a.nalyze it in the subjeet. In faot, man,- ot 
the soienoes depended on just suoh causal proposition.. Upon 
what basis then Gould the subjeot and predicate be joined in 
propositions of this sort! Kant formulated his dilemma in these 
words, ":aegal'dins this ontolog10al l'eason [the ,...ea1 oa.us!j and 
its oonnect10n with a. 1'8a1 eonsequenoe, here 1s the question I 
a.sk; How oan we understand that 'Because a oertain thins ex-
1sts, another thing must exist't-S 
Th1s dtle_, oontusedl,. present in Kant's disserta-
tion ot 1755,9 and intenstfied by his own pre-oritioal ponder-
1ngs, was rendered even more aoute by Kant's aoquaintance10 with 
aumet. questionings upon the pr1noiple of cauaa11t,-. Since 1t 
wa3 not selt-evident tOl' HUme that every event should baYe a 
cause, what was tbat th1~d something by which ,he synthes1s ot 
subject and predicate In the causal pl'inoiple oDuld b., acoom-
plished? Kant, hoJle"~, did not agree with Hume that this 
link1ng sprang fi-om. an inn8)' babi'b i'ol'sed 07 ex.per1enoe,. ainee 
e Ibld. 
9 Ct. Mal'oohal, .&!. PoiQt .2.!. peRal't~ III, 33-35. 
10 As Smith suggests in his .Q.~ntar{, xxix, this ae 
quaintanoe may pel'bapa have been only an indire. one occaSioned 
by Kant •• reading ot Beattie t • criticism of Hume. 
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this led to soepticism, the destruction ot solence.ll And Kant 
always acoepted the well-reputed ex1sting scienoes without ques-
'tien. He accepted them. us givorl, as .tutios points in his 
stud,._ Motte01'el'. unllke It\lJl1ti), Kant dld 1.10t 11m1t h1s inquiX? 
into the nexus for the oausal axiom alone, but extended his In-
vestigation to all those Judgment. of both valid and pl'etent10ua 
seienoe, wherein the predicate did not seem contained in the 
oontent .f the subJeot. What did hi. investigation reveal, and 
how did Kant orystallize 1ts findings' 
ftl'st, Kant said that even in an unph11oso*cal sta'. 
men possessed judgments that .ere independent of experi.no.,12 
J\1dgments that dld not tl. the mind down to this partioular t1M 
and pla.e. Po:- example, man knew not only that "KAnt.s house 
had been built \),. someone,U-thls was singula:- knowledse ... bU'li 
alao that "Whatever happens has a. cause." ~ latter judpent 
was on the un1V8raal plane. Men gave a uniV8l'sal assent to 'h1s 
siultem.ent, and m.eant that 1t could be appliea to any and all 
happenings. 
In addition, men attirmed this judgment and other. 
like 1t with strict necosslt7. "Whateve~ happeDS .us' have a 
• 
cause. It Kant saw that these Judgmen'. which welte unive~.al and 
11 Of. Kant, .9.,1'11;1S\1e, 35. 
19 Kant, Srl~~Q!!' 26. 
necessary were absolutely demanded by th~ sciences. POl" th$ 
sCiences were to give msn power oyer the things and events the7 
encountered. Wlthout universal, necessary judgmenta, solenoe 
\40u1d become as VEU'iable and lhdted as the experienoe of in-
dividual men. Men 'Would not be able to re1, at all upon the 
applicabl11t;r of solentltlc principles. nor could these prino! .. 
ples be said to be tru.fIl. ConsequentlJ, sClenGeD1Wlt bav. univer-
sal, nee.searl judgments. 
Seoond17, l"esa.rd1og this W11V$rsal neO$SIUlr7 type of 
judgment, which Kant called !. ,,1'101',1 to d iatingulsh it .from judg-
ments derived h-om e.xpellllence, 01' !. :2etrb.~lorl as he .a,..., there 
arose the evident need of investigating the following questlon •• 
Row could the buman mind possess such!. prior! judgments' ~_ 
wha' pr1nciples did tbls knowledge sp~ina1 Row muoh of thl. 
knowledge was genulne? 
Next, Kant 'becan, th1s Inves1;1gat1on of !. ;ex-10r& Judg-
ments. Bie fh'-st slap was oare.t\tll,. to distinguish this a priori. 
-
knowledge 1nto two types. Be was .familial' with that type 1ft 
whioh the pred1ca1J. \1'&' contained in the su.bJeot. 1'hese judg-
ments Kant called anal7tioal 01' explloative, a !noe the,. ana.l,.zetS 
0,", e.xp1aine4 the thougb.t.contant of the su.bjeot-conoept;. Thare 
W&s no d1tf1cult,. about these ana1ftlc !. pl'iori judpenta. 
While percetving their 1mportanoe 10 elar1t71ng solenoe, Kant 
alao saw that this wa. Dot the on17 type of !. arlori knowledge. 
M 
It 1t were the o1'l17 'we, aolonoe oould De"l' ataoOWI' an)'ihina 
Hally new ,for 10th!. ':roo the pred1cat. alwar. e.na'e4 a1-
roadr in tba sUbS •• '_ 
1bt o~r'7pe of .! il'&.r£& juds-nt, without wi'11oh 
sll0.e CQu14 not OW,, wu the alijjot<ud.a1l1Ve ju4plC1rlia, .. 
s:rnthe1Jlo judpGnt, as Kant .a:UAd 1tl. ThU type a~n1;Gd th8 
thousht-oOQto' of th$ flub,.", '0,. adding to it a oompl.tJelf now 
p.odJ.o .. '. no' tonk10ed 111 the aDJ •• '_ 'lb.1a 8,..0'111.0'10 ~ 
.uSe it posslblf!t tar 8cd.e.e· to .'taln aa 1:n014$4,_. I' enable< 
soleaoe to taake 'Pl',pe •• about 1t. subj •• , _"._ 
1"AI.t; ,pille1;10 SllC1~n1;.A l£loE& eX1atl.d was .. kIt_ 
tao' tor KAnt. ae .t1' .. 1e.lI17 addu.oeel EUQuapl •• iYOl1!1 aU the 
lenla of •• leu... ~ to11ow1rll weN so_ of hb ape. __ • 
•• yell pl. .ft..,. 8qwa18 ' •• lft, a •• ~b.'11ne ..... n "'. po1D1I1 
11 the .her' •• ', In all .~loat1on ot mot1on, a.tlon aM l'o-
aotion .. , alwql 'bGequal, the .... 14 .. , have a beg1nn1ns.1t3 
AU thea. ~les ~" UDiY8ltaa1 and flEHl8Sauy in theb- _de 0: 
predioation. And, aoool"d1ns; to l~t. tb.ef.~ pl'edloa' ..... no' 
oontained a.ll OQvox-t17 in ,he aub3u'b-ooncepl.1a 
Bowey_, wl1ih 'his ifPG 0:1: aJ1.lthe1i1e juds-nt A 2t"12£A 
KQn_ aaw a Dew p~obl.lil arl:dxlS_ ,,\1 though 3udgm.o:nt. 1\"01'11 $Xpel"-
len.. (aJl1thetlc judPlOntA.J1 :aoiatU:&E&) could valldl1 a~ 
1& ~~. 32.&3. 
the oontent of the subjeot by amplo7ing aotual expe~lene. to 
justity conneoting a new predioate to the subjeot, st111, with 
this new t)'PG of synthetI0 judgment, in whioh there was a oom-
plete d1V01'O$ trom exper1enoe, what oould be the unknown X which 
justifIed the linking or the neW pl'adloate to the subjeot? ~ 
example, in judpenta involving tiL oausal relation l1ke ttWhatever 
happens bas a cauae,· What prinoiple allowed one to conneot ue. 
aauae" to "whaiUtver happen. ft ... and that necessuil., and universal 
111 The evidence of expar1enee was neIther suttlc1ent17 unlv.!' .. 
sal nor neoessary. 
For Kant 'tihis problem _aa emphasized In synthetic 
judsmen'ti. ~ E~1orl Of oausallty, beoause tor him on17 one tera 
01' tb8 causal relation oould be tound b7 his &na11s1s ot the 
atatl0 subjeet-ooncept.l • Now whenoe dtd tbe.. causal relations 
arise' ~tr neOGssltl ruled out ohangeable experience aa a 
source. f.bet.rela'lvlt7 excluded _he absolute ooneept a8 a 
source. The onl,. remain1ns aolXt'ce was the lmowins mind, and 
tharef·Ol'e xaat was fao.4 with the absolute need or .!. 2r1os-& oon-
dl tioDa or mentu!l.l tWItS tOl1 s!,\T1na the If.cieno •• whioh would 11. 
impotent without oausal prlnoiplea. KAnt kn •• that aince be had 
de1HJrmined to saYe selene. tJlom the out.et, he had to j'WIt1t7 t 
joining of tbe predioate to tbe subjeot in all thea. synthetic 
• 'd 'I 
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judgments A 21"10£1 • 
. B1"leflYI 1n order 'bo be genu1ne, scienoe had to haft 
synthetio .!. '11'101'1 judgmenta ... aynthotlc judgments to in.va new .. 
nesS and sOientlt1c progrea8J~ R~&or& judgments to insure un-
ohangeableness and unlvax-sa11ty 1n sclence. In reacting aga1ns' 
Hume' ••• naistt. seepiloi.ra. Kant was trying to deZend and to 
pro.cte solenee bJ' means of syntbet" judgmeats .! 21'~orl. Theft 
was onl,. one weak-spot with these jw.1pents. 110\1 oould that 
toreisn predioate be Jotned Tal1dl1 to ijQe subJeot? And tbus 
Kabt crystallizes his entbe q2\ltlg,v.e, he :t'1oal17 touoheur the 
core questlon of the Kant1an 57"tam wben he asks. "How al'e 8fll-
tbetic judgm$hts .l El:'lo:t;.l posslbletu1S 'lh1s problem J%lS.rka the 
pivota.l :point of I'.ant t • w01"k. 
Now no one dou'bts the benetit. ot un!. t1 and cl~lt'7 
that a oent1"€.l.l probl.a can bestow on an author's work. Bowe .... r, 
atte~ tteadlng and stud71ns the Ox-1t1iSe, 8Jlrone Who make. a 
11ttle ren •• tu.on upon Kant'. centll'al ques'i1on, tbe mult1tude ot 
smaller pX'oblems involved. and the va.' c,\onaequ$W)es 1mp11ed, 
=-7 w$11 find two questions ooourr1ng 1n his thought. Bas Kant 
made an o.el'-.1mplif1cat1on 1n tOJ'Jmllatlng 'the problem' It not, 
has he, then, olear17 shown the exaot baftttlng of aYe!'7 sub-
.-dina,.a p.roblcna to this. que.'ion about the po.s1b1l1tl til 
15 1\9.nt, Cr1t1g,ue, 3S. 
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synthetic judgments ~ R~1o~1'le 
Man7 critics confess at least soma obscurity in find-
ing the preois. internal relation of all the parts of ta. 
Crltliue It tgFe ReasQn to the oritioal problem stated in th8 
1ntroduot1on.17 But Norman Kemp Sm1th goes beyond this aDd 
suggests that Kant 1s guilt., of over-simplifioation. sinoe Kant 
does not carefull., detine what he means bJ' the qu.estion and thu.a 
leaves room for man., additional problema.18 
Up t. this po1nt 'he ohapteX' has deali; with the oallle. 
or Kant-. oritioal problem and how he finall., focused upon his 
cen1;l'al problem, n .. 17. "HOW are sJllthetlo .fudpenta ~ 2X'lor1 
possibl.'" In s~ry, then. 1t has been shown that Kant se' 
18 Note that other great minds have atuempted to re-
duoe tb$ whole of their work to a 81ngle problem and som&t~s 
have. suo. oeeded. An example of this can be tound in the !~ 
'rll&olo5foa or St. Thomas Aquinas. He tells us (1n s. 'l!., • 2, 
1)', Ipr noipalla lntt!ultio ••• e.t Del oognltlonemtrade" •• tI 
Thus his central proble. 1s "VJho 1s God 1" and he takas pal1'ls to 
poiQt out at least in general the :relation of .Ol'e than. a thou-
sand articles towards the solution of this probl~. His habit 
ot showing the oonneotion between various qaestiona and sub. 
questions 1s done Ter'1 b .. letly, perhaps, even in an 1ntroducto17 
pbraae. but 1t 1s done. ot. to%' example, !. 1., 1.11, 90, 
proo.mum, where st. Thomas indicates the conneotion between his 
treatise on Satan and his treatises on law and graoe, adding the 
relations of subordinate artIcles. 
17 ct. fol' example, Smith! c~entar~ xxI'paton, 
~t'. Me:tiaaI1C,.!! ~er1ea •• , 4a-t>OJ~ l'. L dsaT, "Int1"o-iiiw!on," 'Eo . erJmG.nstIS~arJ' edition of the C,rltig,u!I x-xi. 
lB Smith, Co~ntarl, 43. 
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out to defend seience and morals. He was oonfronted with con-
flicts and dilemmas a~islng from a oontradiotory rationalism. 
Uumets s08pti01sm .. and the natUl'al S olenoes. Atter marl', '1eaI-S 
ot patient pondering he overoame these obstacles by disoover1ng 
S1Dthet10 judgments .! l?r10l:'1. which led bim., as if by a secret 
pass, to valid science and solid morals. But than ~ere re-
mained the problem ot explaining how thBse judgments oould be 
tONed. Th1s last question, the~erore, became his ohief concern 
Now this present stud., a:bte~t8 to discover Y/hat waa 
Kant's exaot ~aning in his baslo question. It has been pointed 
out previously that even an fUlIsayed objeotive interpretation of 
Kant's words by reoognized Kant1an scholars leads on17 2~obabll 
to Kant's actual meaning. Th$ interpretations which tollow 
aoceni;ua:be this fact While exposing a multipleX answer to the 
p:t*esen' quel'71 wut doe. Kant mean b7 his sta.rting question? 
In oo_enting on Kant's starting question, N. K. Smith 
saJs that the Dol,. words 1n it whioh do not admit of amb1gu1t7 
and 08.\UUt trouble al'e "s7Uthetio Juds-nt. A 2r.lor&" since the 
"ROW" and the npossible" admit ot man1 dUf.rent senses. An4 
let, aa shall be seen later on, that very pb.raae, "S711theti0 
Judgments .~ 2rlop1," de.plte all of Kant'. desoriptions and 
subdivisions. 1s not altosethe:r olea~ and unquas1lionable.19 
n ri r 
TberetOl'O, Tax-1aus :mo:an1nsa oan be expOOh4 in eve'1!'S pQ" .. ,.. 
Siw,l'ting q\&Gstlon. ~ words, -Bow,· "synthet.lo judemeJl1ul!. 
priori, tt e.na "1'oIs11.110" -111 .a.11. btl o(}tu,lderea in ita t .. n. 
1110 w()t'd "llow" pl'$senta tVIO different: lll.,nUl1t1gs. It 
:ma.,~~1l'£tt .intl'OOUO$ a quoatlQQ asklng, tt 1n what: war, It tflJl what; 
faculties and .quip_nt, ft do synbttc 3ud~Qi\$ AB&2tt.J.. come 
a'Uout;_ o~ 4sal0, tba' -Do,." -1 be 7.4"0$4 to aOTslSthins 11_. 
"Well, as .. ma t'~ 01' tao', hew al"e'hey POI a 1b1.'· In ~b.1' 
exolaltat01*1' atlas. the -Bow· ls equivalent to a ~"lbothor.· f41d 
in o.ooo~d w1\h the ODe .. tho otheJ' mea!U.oc;, either- r.ant'a 
IU2a17tloox- his s7J;'lthetl0 l.ltGthod He. to ElMWOl* ,be or1""oa1 
pl'ob1 .. mo.. tlfl.tufuc1;ol'llJ .20 
b p~tla., -,,;ynthe'" 3udgmen1Ja a prlol'l,· denot.. a 
....... , .. ,'. , 
t;:rpe e1' 3udsaent whioh av~arl suftlo1611tlJ cleQ "tore u,.am1na 
'1on. tJrlt11 the e~l'i.al part ot tulla t1\ .. 1I, 1t may be taken 
tot' &1-$.0'.4, ao B'a.ttt ~ol.f aeome 11. do, ~t the ua:t\a'C of 
that whioh he dlvUos, lllUi!le17, juds-nts, 18 adeq,ua1Je17 k'nawn.2l 
As tor .e. .wtiS&. Ka.nt •• 111 Me J.teaae1"'tl tbat 1t .,t:IJlS 
independence tltom 6ltpOl-J.e.e.22 Oon4tequelltlJ, he d1v14.a 
1 4 II I I .,. t II PI 
20 smth, pJ!D!itUZ' 43.46. 
21 &'111 ltr;.m'. s.snol*anoe of tl.ut nata •• of Judgme-
wiU bo shewn as a major oaule in theobeolD""ltJ of hi' division 
of Jud ... '. f 'rh11 18 • ___ %tHed 1n ChapiJe. IV, page 90 of the 
p"eaent 'hefd... To be summarized later. 
I 
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judgments ~ 2rlerl intO' thoso whioh are independent of this o~ 
that experience, snd those which are entirely independent ot 
experience. The latter type ef juCSgment he subdivides intO' 
impux-e !. 2rlorl judgments t tha t is I those which, thouf;h made 
without an7 d~ect 1"ete~&ne. to' experience, have borrowed at 
least one cO'ncepticn from that seut'Oe. snd into puro !. 2rlo~1 
judgments Inwhich nct O'n17 the nexus but alsO' the cO'noeptiO'ns 
are entirel1 independent of experienoe. When cne analrzes these 
subdivisions, he may wonder whether S!. £ae1;O he has an,. suoh 
pl.1r$ !. 2r~O'rl judgments which are a.bsolutely nen-empirical, 
wlthnc strings attaohed to' them trailing back to' former sensa-
tiens. Such Judgments Gould not, of oOUl-se, be bad without 
Kant's CO'pernioan Reyolutiun being true.23 
Since H. J. Patonts tx-ea:tnaent of "sJrlthetlc" j\\dpenta 
seems Y6%7' apt, attention 18 oalled ~o his faithful exposition 
of what Kant means 01 "s,nth8t10." 
Tba turning point of this discussion 1. the diatinotl0 
between analJtlc and synthetio judgment •• 
At first eight no distlnction would seeIU to. be s1m-
pler. Either the predi(,Hllte B belongs to the subjeot A as 
sOWlth1ng which is contained (oovex·tlJ) 1n the conoept ot 
A-this 1s an analytic judgment: or else the pt'ed1oate B 
11es entirell outside the concept of A, although 1t is 
oonneoted with It-th1a 1s a synthetie judgment. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Synthetio judgments may be either a EosteElor! or a 




equal to two right angles' 1s a synthetio ! riori juds-
ment. In both cases the p~edloate adds some SIng whioh 
is not thDUSht in Ube oonoept of the subject, but the 
seoond judgment 1s charaoteri.ed by necessity and univer-
sality, and is tnerefore, ! prior1 as well as s~1thetlc.24 
Thus fa~ one sees a olear description and division of tbe spe-
cies of synthetic judgments. 
But, as Paton adm1ts,25 the difficulty is this, ttwhat 
is implioit and what 1s not implioit 10 a ooncept? It might 
seem to be implioit 1n the conoept of triangle that the interior 
angles al'e. equal to two right angles J but this Kant would detlJ' 
to be an analytio judgment." 
As tor examples of analytic judgments, Kant presents 
"anow 1s White" and Paton offers "gold is yellow," thus indicat-
ing that "white" is implioit in "snow," and "yellow" implicit ln 
"sold." On the other hand, they a£1'11'm. that synthetio judgments 
are exemplified by proposi'liions such as "bodies are hsa'V7" and 
"swans are white," where "heavy" and "White" are not implicit in 
the respeotive sUbjeots. 
How wbJ "white" should be contained implicitly 1n the 
conoept ot snow and not in that of swan 1s not too evIdent upon 
examination. Yes, there are swan a which are not white. Still is 
it impossible that tbex'e be a snow which is not white? M01'BOVer, 
24 Ibld. 82-83. 
25 Ibid. 85. 
tbe reason why "gold-is-yellow" should merit different 01ass1-
1'10&t10n than ftbod18$_Al'e-heavyu a88JDS somewhat subjeotive, it 
not entt.ell 80. Even the pro-Kantlan Paton admit. Mtn. nature 
of analytic judgments [and consequentl,. of' s:ynthetic juagmanti] 
18 not altogetMt' 0188.%,.26 This ebsourli,. may arise fro. Kant •• 
_noel' of dividing judgJll8niuI. 
The final expression in Kant's crltl,al p.X'oblem to 1M 
examined 1s the W'ol'd "poJuslble", and here N. K. Smith .. tollowlns 
Valh1ngel', points out six dlfterent meanings of tfp08s1ble," all 
of Which Kant emplo7' at various t1_a. The au meanings, wlwn 
11sted 1n contrasting pairs, are as tollows. How are synthetl0 
judsments !. Erlorl iIsgholoSiculll:l posslble' How ~osloa'lz 
i2$sib •• ' Bow are they po.sible of .!l2l!na~lon.? Row ptuuJible 
ot an .xi.tene,? How are the,. posslble in the ~.a*? Row al'e 
the,. possible in the 1d ... ,? Eaoh meaning w111 be 'aken up "%7 
brlet1,._ 
BOw are sJnthetl0 jud~nt. ~ a~lo~l 2ls0ho.os1cal6l 
peas lble , In o~.r WO.d8, what are tbe subj.etlve conditione 
.for this type of ,udpent' 'l'hltough what mental taoultS,.a do 
t;hey take pla.e? stud,. of the Transoendental Aesthetio a~ the 
Tran.cendental Analytic reveals that !ant will include the tor .. 
Of aenaation (space and tl .. ) and the pure torms ot thought (the 
2S fb14. 86. 
catego~les) in bis response to this question. 
How are these jud~nt. 106108.111 possIble' or how 
can they be valtd! ~1. question is 10 It.ett twofold, embra.-
ing ~e po •• ibl1itr of some nexus between subjeot and predioate. 
and the pO'$1b:1l1ty of an objeotlvely val:1d p%'edloatlon or the.e 
judgments. 
Row £Ute these judgment. poss1ble of eaFJj>lagatlon? How 
1s Kant going to aooount tor them.? They have te be made ooltpre-
hena1ble. Tbis question flJAy well have goaded Kant on to popu-
larize his dootrine in the Probesomega. 
BOw are synthetio judgments ~ Erlp~1 possible of,"~llt 
"noe? In other w9rda, how can 1me:r ex18' at all? Aocording to 
the rationalists and empiriolst. 1t wQuld aeem one oannot even 
think suoh ju.dpenta. 
La.'ly, sinoe Kant employs all 81% meanings of "pos-
slble," it seems advisable to present a summary paraphrase ot 
N. K. Smitht • final distinction between Jud~nta which are 
possible in the 1"eal llnd in the ~p.aiL.27 According to Kant, 
nain.tfal soienee and mathematics already enat compo.ed or sJU-
thet10 judsa:aents .! Ill-,io!:i. When applied to these judgaents, 
Kant 1s 1n1t1a1 question asks how these rea. judgments used 01 
scientists oan ex1st. 
27 Srd th, CQmmentarz;. 52, whioh is pa.raphrased hero. 
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But 1n Kant-s opInIon metaphysIcs has not yet been 
cohel'entl;y realized. ifhus 1t remains a goal to be 8t1'1"n tot-
along w1th the synthetio judgments A prlo~1 whioh are expected 
to torm its taot-10. Knotts basic question, when direoted at 
these judgments ot the futUl'e, lI1ght be replu.'tased nlOl'e exp11cit. 
ly into, ~BDw are these ~deal synthetio judgments ~ Erior1 ot 
the new metaphysic possible?" Kant offerea the basis ot th1s 
last d1ffereDO. in meaning wben be formulated hi. startlns ques-
tion in one way for pbJslos ano n~thbmatl0. and in anot~r wal 
for m&taph1.s10s.2S 
In St~ then, one finds not a. 11ttle ditfioult,.. and 
oomplex1tl in seekIng the moaning of a seemingly simple question 
Its tmmedtata clarlt1 1s attraotiveJ and Jet, on further invest1 
gat10n, so man7 v~ioua meanings are found 1n every expression 
tha1i one begins to wonder whether Kant oould not have stated hi. 
st~lns question aore aha~ply aDd unmistakably, or perhaps, 
oyen wheth&r he baa posed a real problem. 
" . 
To obviate this doubt about the rea11t:v or h1s cr1t1ca 
problem, Kant directs the evidence of his Introduction towa~ds 
establiShing the real existence of an ~ 2rior1 synthesis. And 
this commenoes the third pu1i or the pl*Nent chapter: the proof 
of Kantts proble •• 
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Now although the existence ot S Olue aensible things oan 
be apprehended immediately through sensibly experiencing those 
things. it frequently- happens that s.tf11'mat1ons of :real exist. 
enoe rest on a transit of' the mind trOI;' an e:dsting effeot to 
its real cawse, as in the wall-known e.x.amp1e ot Robinson 
Crusoe's 01scover7 of the existence of another man on his island. 
Ku.nt thinks tbe existenoe of synthetio judpents !.21'Io%',i 18 
1Dmted1ate17 eTident. Nevertheless, tOl' h1areadvB' sake be 
em1')10'18 1n the Introduotion 1iil:l.1s •• cond method of inferring 
their existanceb7 moving ~o. existing propositions to speoifio 
aots ot understanding. 
Therefore I in the tah1rd part of this ohapter an effort 
w111 be made to ana11se this Q1'IguJl'J8nt of Kant in to\ll* W8.7.' (1) 
07 finding what bis tive premises are, (2) b1 bringing to l~t 
the logioal oonsequenoe which binds hS.s tlTe pl'emiaes toget;ber_ 
(3) b7 uncovex-lng the foundations of these five premiae., and 
(~) b1 pointing out one conoom1tant of these premises, namal1. 
the preclUSion ot an abstraotive 101;811.ot. 
An examination of' tbe Prefsoe and Introduotion to 
Kant's second edition reveals his use ot five senel*a1 premiaes. 
I~st, the bJpothesls ot the Copernioan ReTo1ution is justified. 
Seoond17, universality and necessit,. are the .1gns ot !. 2"101'1 
judgments. Th1rd17.!. priori judgments exist in the soiences. 
Eburthly. the oriterion of synthetio judgments is the predicate' 
r 
non-inclusion in the subjeot.s content. And fifthly. the sol-
onces actually involve synthetio judgments ~ Erior~. 
Since the logioal oonnection ot these premises does not 
beoo~e evident trom this list, their natural dependeDCG upon tb$ 
preoeding premises may be brought out expltcltly by reasonIng 
a.long with Kant 1n the 10110\110g manner. 
I oannot ask "Bow ue synthetio judgments .! priori 
possible?" unless I know that they are possible. But the way to 
prove them possible is to px-ove thea existenoe. brefotte DfJ 
first supposition is the existenca of synthetic judgments a 
-~r1or1.29 But as their existence will be or no use to me unless 
I have some way ot' t>3111ng that they do Elx1st,I must lecondl,. 
establish a nottDl tor l'ocognizing s;ynthet10 judgments !. 2rl~01'1.SO 
But this nON, too would be mean1ngl.ss unless s oms !. pr1,orJ: 
know1edae were possible. 'rherefore.. I must show, as rq third 
aupposition_ the S!. 1'aot! existenoe 01' some !. 2%*10%*1 knoWledge.31 
To do so, I must set down in advanne a norm tor distinguishing it 
with oertalntr trom !. ioeterlorA knowledge. This will be ., 
fourth premise.32 But even this norm wIll be meaningless unless 
.1 
29 Kant., ~r'tisue, 32. 
30 Ibid. 30 ... 31. 
-
31 I'bld. 26-28. 
32 Ibid. 25-26. 
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there 1s the possibility of some ~ priori knowledge in general. 
The:r:>ef'ore I must es:tiabllsh the .!!.e.!. ~ua non condition of' the 
possibIlity of ~ 2r1orl knowledge, namely. tn. oonformity ot 
things to the mind. This will be m;r t'1fth and la.st suppos! .... 
t.1on.33 
But ho'w does Kant establish and %'s-antoroe these suppo. 
sitions? On what X'easons do his .five premises restf Wl'q', tor 
example, does he o1a1m that the h1Pothesls of his ·Oopernioan 
Revolution" 1s justified? He answers that the need of discover-
ing the funda.~ntal diffioulty whioh reta.rds the growth at 
metaphysios, a.nd the ex.a.mples of the other well-developed so1.-
enoe8, are reall1 suffio1ent oa.uses tor inverting the direotion 
of man 1s knowing, a' least as an experiment. 
Universality and strict necessity are the norma tor 
reoognizing !. i!rlorl knowledge becausG, ea78 Kant, onl,. sub-
jective generaliaation can mar-k that knoWledge whioh we fOh 
trom exper1ence. 
An70ne familiar with the demands ot soience knows that 
1ts propositions ~t be universal and necessa~J and Since 
val-ious scienoes exist; !. 2rlor1 judgments a.lso exist. Such 1s 




l~nt views his fourth premise as a truly origina134 
basis for dividing ~ priori judgments. Either the predioate is 
implicit in the subject or it is net. Thus the important impli-
oation of this pl'emise, Y/hich Ka.nt .1'e17 pOSits without thorough 
explanation. 1s the existenoe of some norm that determines the 
extent of contenta. in the subjeot .. concept. bl'e exists aome 
principle which determines that "white" will be contained in the 
ooncept of "snow" but excludes "heavy" from the concept of 
"body." 
Kant rests his final premise, that the sciences aotual-
17 inolude s,ntbetio judgments ~ 21'101'1, upon an exposition of 
the synthetio and ~ 21'101'1 oharacter ot judgments such as= 
"seven plus five equals twelve," "in all ohanges of the material 
world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged," and "the world 
must have a beginning." 
Such are the foundations upon which Kant rests t~ 
premises of his proof. It seems strange that eaoh one of these 
explioit premises effeotively preoludes the theory of abstraction 
as a possible explanation of the origin of universal, necessary 
judgments. And yet, right from the beginning of his oritioal 
thinking, when Kant bad first eA~lained his dlffloult7 to Marcus 
Herz, abst~aot1on was ruled out. 
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Henoe, the pure conoept of' the understnnding cannot be 
abstracted from the data of the senses, nor do they ex-
pl.'tess our oapaoity for receiving representations through 
the senses. But,whilst they Dave their souroes in the 
nature 01' the soul, they originate there neither as the 
result of the action of the QbJect upon it, nor as the~ 
selves producing the object.~5 
Through thi$ omiaa10n or positive exclusion of another "hypoth-
es1s," Kant may be forming a parvus, tnorJ..a initio against 
whioh st. Thomas gives warning. However, such a suspioion per-
tains mora to the critical part of this thesis. 
35 Kant, Letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772, 
translation taken from Smith, C9!e!nt&rZ, 220. 
CHAPTER IV 
EVALUATION OF Y~NT'S PROOF 
At this point it ls necessa~7 for a mora thorough 
understanding of tne nat~a of Kant.s arguments to examine hi. 
premiaes rather oarefull,._ For thls de'ba,iled ana17sls two of h1 
fiYe premiae. have been seleoted. F1rst, Kant's division ot 
judgments will be examined to tlnd t1» cause. ot the obscurlt,-
already noted. Seoondl,., Kant •• "Copernioan Revolution" will be 
studied to see whether 1t meets tbJ requirements of a justifiable 
!In>othesie. 
The obscurlty and contusion resulting f~om Kant's divi-
slon of judgmants were established as faots when treat1ng in the 
previous ohapter about Kant's exact meaning in tne phrase "syn-
theta judgments !. ll£'o~,. ttl At present the oauses of thi. 
obsourity a.nd oontusion are sought. HOYI can they be found? The 
. 
method selected 1n this study is empir1cal. It prooeeds on the 
prinoiple that one very probable aause of this obsaurlt,. was 
Kant •• failure to ~asp olearly the elements oonst1tut1ng that 
1 Cf. pages 69.62 of the present thesis. 
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which he 1ntended to divide. ConsequentlY, a study of Kant t • 
judgments conside1-ed 1n thea constitutive elements of ton and 
matter (the copula and the conceptions or subject and pttedicate 
respective1,.) will elucidate the causes of the disagreements and 
difficulties in Kant's division. Fer the sake of cluit" the 
term Jud,_n~ will be used to indicate the intellectual operatio 
ttselt, and 2ro2ositioA to stgnir, the known term of that opera-
tion. 
In examining propositions rust according to their 
formal element, namel,., the1r copula, it ts seen that Kant explio 
1t17 atf1rms tba t the predicate alw9.7S be,12Di~ to the subject 1n 
at tillmattve judgments. Scholastics can recognize hAtre the1%' re-
latlon ot inherence. In an8.17t10 judgments Kant speclfies this 
belonging or inherenoe as a relation of ident1ty joining the 
predicate and subject.2 FOr synthetic judgments this belonsing 
is not bad through a relat10n of identity, in Kant's sen.e, but 
through a concrei;e union of'S. and F. grasped in e~r1en.e,f 01-
thx"ough a ome other unknown X as unif71ng bond. 
Before continuing with tn. examination, a distinction 
1s in order conoerning this relat10n ot inherence. This relation 
may be twofold. There 18 the actual relation whioh exists and 
also the relation which the knower affirms as existing. 1~8. 
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two w1ll be identical in true un1versal propositIons, but d1f. 
ferent when the propositions are false. 
Fol'l example, in the propos1tion, "Gold 1s non-rusting," 
the:re 1s a X'alatlon exist1ng between the mean1ng ot "gold" and 
that of "something whioh does not rust.- T.he aotual relation ma, 
be one ot ldent1t:r, though tbe knower may attlttta 1t as a non-
identioa1 relation. It is obvlous, therefore, that a division at 
judgments based on the relation "hieh the knower att1rms as ex-
isting between S. and P. rather than upon the actually extstins 
relation will cause oontusion and obsourlty when many men oome t, 
employ the division. 
Moreover, a further souroe ot obsourity oan be seen it 
the diviSion e:r judemen~s is based not on tba formal relation ot 
identity or non-identity, but upon the intellectual operation 
through which these %»01at10n8 are apprehended, i.e., the opera-
tioDS of analysis and synthesis. 
Using the example given above, one man may gl'asp the 
identity between "gold tl a.nd "non-rustingn b7 analyzing his oon .. 
oapt 01' "sold," even If someone else must make the af't1rltlation 
only through synthesis. 
These observations reveal t~ee possible bases to. 
dividing judgments. These bases oonsl., in differenoes :t'ound 
(1) in the objeotive relation between S. and P., (2) in the 
relation whioh is affirmed as existing be,ween S. and P. by some 
ImoWGJ', and 13) Sa 11M opera' 100 ot Judasa.. 
It allouW .. notio.a _bat in dlvldlna ~u4_._ .. 
t .... , 'buu _n'1o".4 ahc\lJ.rl al-ra 1M tbe AlDdaBD1lalnOh it 
.. ob~.otiY1t1 ota 1018a'I£10 d1vla1on 18 .ougllt. Bowe .... , 
tho o1dw. bu.sahouJ,d hot; '0. ov-lookad 1n la'or auWlv1alon.l. 
It alao toUo ... , .,. ... a, divi8ion or ~g4 .. r.t1uJ ".et. oft 
the a.oODd Q4 tbiN •••• g1.$a abore, iho ... " ,"00._ .J.n-
~.c'e4 .1~.~~ .. '1v1a •• 
... ltNa' •• en dlyiding ~"_"" ."71, "Au.l»1d,oal 
lUCIa-a" (.tf~_tt") ....... , ... 1ho.. 1&'3 whl0h t4le .am .. -
iion or -.. ,..d10a'. "ltab tbe ftb~ •• ' AI!. &~ 1Jm-oUlb 14e-
tlt,._8 .. ,8.tiloa "b:1oh irrsmedla'.1J 6»11 •• u, who Goaltat •• 
l' '.oup U.ut!'" !lui' _,. BUt 0 ••• , po~. -7 Dot. 
Ibi* 'b •• i. ot <11vbloD is lob' GUf,llo:rlns he •• t Is '1; .. Ob-
380"" "la'ioa ot S. qd P ....... "lata. wlUch 11 4'..,1J' 
attlNed '" ... lDdlvl<half 
.... ,ue'a'lOb .t glftJl Sa la.utileS. •• ' •• Ihow 
oODvlnolbsl:r kal's •• or 1. 8b009 .818. Btit; a --110. pe. 
usal fit _ t~ pQt of hU ~\tc'1ea caanot JAaw ... 
dou'b'li. De8ide. ttl. fJ ..... "teNDO.' ,. bf.IIIelt Wb10h 1M' 
_.- .a ,. *' pe.'OD J\ld81ns, ezpu.ctt iSs' uo toUll.4 1n41oai;. 
'- ,btl, Id.a a:ttentlon 18 too_ed on the 1 •• 0Il4 })u1 •• on .. 
• IS r ." I U UtI II 
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relation \vhioh his mind attll,'ll'llB as existing between conceptions. 
V~reover, KAnt denominates propositions according to 
the operation used in their ro~matlon. This 1s brought out bJ 
his terminology_ And his cla1m ot o1'181no.11t,-5 in div1ding judg 
ments may have some fundament in so fax- as analysis and aynthcs1 
are now made a norm of division. Tb1s third b~s18 is as eA~11o-
1t17 used as that ot oogitated ident1ty.6 
Thus, the present examinat10n revea:a.s some subject1vis 
in the language used by Kant to describe the copula in judgment. 
Does this subjeotivism also exist 1n the examples he ofteps? A 
4 Examples of this taken trom Kant, cr1t~~. 30-32, 
are the tollowinS: "In all Judgments whereln tlifj 1'6 Pion Of iii. 
subjeot; to the predioate 1s ,00811;0.1;&<3 • • • .. (not s1mplJ'. 1s)J 
"this relation is possible 31'l ~WQ ~r.rtorent ways." (Does"""'rB.nt 
aean PO.SSib1eOf i;&nl 1n two dlttel,'lent ways, or possible .tt 
belPI tho " t tii 0 1tfe1"e·nt wars?), "I need not go beyoii<T the 
00 cs 0 0 bod,. ••• ", "the manltol&-prop81"tles Which I thin 
n conception ••• ft, "loan C0fe!ZO beforehand by Qnil7S 
the oonception of body ••• "ft"J~ow n am I a~te to assert 
• .. ." J Ita t01'elsn p1"edlcate B which the i'fders andlns neverthe. 
less oonsider5 t. § ~ c,onneotEtd with it. "ttiaersool'Ing and 
parenlhesea a de .~ 
5 Paton, Kapt ',' r:>~ta1?li's10 .2! F;:XRe1"lenoe I 85. 
6 Cf. Kant. arltisue, 30-31. ~ example, "I need 
• • • ~relr ana17ze the oonoeption, that is become conscious of 
the manifold propertios which I think in that oonoeption in orde1" 
to d1soover this .,iredloate in 1t: 1t 1s the:refore an ana17tica1 judgment • •• ugoweve16 By the addition of suoh a predicate, 
therefore 1t beoomes a synthetical judgment." ~e reason wbJ it 
18 synthetioal or not is the mind's adding or not.add1ng to the 
subject. This is dividing judgments aocording to the mental 
operation p~oduc1ng them. 
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faw 01' tbase may be oonsidered. 
For example, when I say, 'All bodies are extended,' thia 
is an analyt1cal judgment. FOr I need not go beyond the 
conoeption of' • 1n order to f1nd extension oonneoted 
with it • •• s ls not an e~irloal 4udgment, but a 
proposition which stands f1rm!. i~1Pl1. 
Kant hex-a tells us he disoovers extension in the oonoept of bod7. 
and att~ 1t with striot neoessity_ Be does not prove tb8 
necessity of ~e oonnection. Be affirms 1t. Do othera aee lt 
d1f'telrentlr 1"t'O)l1 Kant? Yea. N. K. Sa1th lays 'tibia proposition 
oannot; 
be ~eoosn11.d as true save in terms of a oo~reban.1V8 
1;heo1'1 of' plqaioal erdstenoEh If _ttar must exist in a 
state ot d1stribution 1n order that 11;8 parts may acquire 
through mu:tual attraotion the property of welght, [then] 
the size ot a bod,., or even lts posses.ing any extension 
wbatsQevel'*, -1 sim1larly Ciepend upon speoifl0 oondlt1ons 
suoh as _7 oonoelvab17 not be unlvel1sal17 reallsea.S 
Here Smi1ih questions the DocesauT un! versal1ty aff1rmEu2 ln 
Kant'. neXWJ. Kant has undoubtedly 8.11ed a univeraal17 expe1"l-
enoed tao'. But perhaps he has contuaed his affirmed relation 
of atr10' universal neoessity between e~ena1on and body wl'h 
tbe objeotive17 existing relation. Besides, 1f this att~4 
relatlon 1s deX'lved trom ezperlence, then how oan 1t also be 
universal and neoessary aocording to K'an1i' 
Secondly, Kant saya the relation in the proposition 
I 1 :(I I 
'1 Ib¥_ 
8 3m'bh, Pomr-ataU' 39. 
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that sevan-plus-f1ve-e equals-twelve 1s not one ot 1dentity. Th1s 
_ana that the predioa.L te 1s not oontained 1n the su?Jeot-conoept. 
yet even the pro-Kant1_an Paton admits, "It may, h01'/9Ver, be maln-
tained that all mathe~t1oal 3udgments are analytl0.u9 Here 
again the olassitioatl_cn of 3udgments seems to depand on the per ... 
• on olassi.r,.lng. 
&a117, Kanat sa.,. '~'ver7thing tha t happens has a 
cause t 1s an example 0.-1' a 81tlthetl0 judgment. The disagt-e .... nt 
of xnost soholastio phi-.... J.osophers with Kant on this judgment be-
cause ot tho1l' e.xposit_~ 10ns ot 1ts analytic nature adds more 
.videnoe 1n the 1nvest_~1gat1on of subjeot1v1sm in Kant's diviSion. 
Do any of Ka:~nt's or1tios oorroborate these indioations 
of subjectivism? Sm1t!~la frequently charges Kant with general 
sub3eotivism.10 1'&tOO_L. who explioitly aims at saving Kant's 
doctrine ~om the oo~.~cding influenoe of Smith's theo~, answers 
the oharge of subjeotl<r:vlsnt in Kant.s dlvlsion of Judgment b:r sar-
ins. "mant-.langua.ge : :Son places might suggest that the dlstino ... 
tlon is subjective} bu,:,_1; thU, I thlnk, 1s t2l'ue only when the 
subjeot-conoept 1. emp!~rioal ••• Kant does not mean h1a di.tine 
'10n to be _rel,. a. sU1fbJectiva one.ull Indeed .. Kant intended hi. 
-
9 Paton .. ~tts Metappzslc 1£ E3Re~1ence. 89. 
10 or. Smith' -. lndex on "Subjectivlsm," Commen,ta1"l. 650 
11 paton, Kar&:ltf~ Metaphn1c !!. a~r!~,enc., 83-84. 
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distinction to be scientifio and objective. But one's intention 
is ~.quent17 misoarried 1n the execution. 
However, Paton's defense, over and above its admission 
01' some subjeotivis1U in Kantfs division, 1s beset with two dif-
fioulties. 
F1rst, Paton's answer seems to be begging the question, 
sinoe one ot the things Kant must establish 1n his proof 1s the 
existence of propositions whose subjeot-oonoepta are absolutely 
independent of experienoe, and not j'WIt wishtul17 thought to be 
so 1ndependetl". 
Seoondly, 1f Kant allows some subjeotivitY' in his div1-
Sian, where i. hB golng to draw the linet If he admits. as he 
does,l2 that the judgment "gold is non.rusting" may be analyti-
oal for those skilled 1n metallurgioal research and at the same 
time synthetioal for those not skilled in handling metal', he 
oannot 10g10al11 retuse to classif)" judgments like "the human 
80ul is 1m=:lDrtaltt as both analytIcal and synthetical under simi-
lar ciroumstanoes. Yet, Kant maIntains this Judgment 'I syn-
thetical without exoeption.1S It tbo norm he allows tor ~elt 
were also applied here, thi8 judgment concerning the human soul's 
immortalitY' would be analytioal for those who see clearl, the 
12 Kant I ~ritig.,¥" 4l7. 
13 Ibld. 241. 
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essential p~opert1es of the soul, and synthetIcal for the majori 
ty whD are non-skilled in psyohological analysis. 
Therefore. both the language and the examples used OJ' 
Kant as well as the testimony of a pro-Kantlan ol--1t10 point to 
one conclusion. Kant tailed to realize that a mette subjective 
lncapao1ty to see that a proposItion 1s actually analytical doea 
not make that judpent synthetio. The elements joinea in judS-
ment do have a relation, and this objeotive nexua-not the sub .... 
jeotive apprehension of 1t, nor the operatIon through which It is 
apprehendea--must be the fUndamental basis in dividing judgments. 
From suoh an examination of Kant-s copula in judgment 
it ~t be more than evident that the variety Of wars in whioh 
the copula was viewed was oaused b,. the veJ:'iety of oontent in the 
subject.oonoept existing among various people. Paton put his 
fingel' to the heart of the pttoblel'l1 aptil;v enough. -The dUfi-
oulty,· he says, "1s to know what 1s implloit, and what 1s not 
1wp1101t 1n a aonoapt."14 
These words -1 serye as an introduot1on to an examina-
tlon ot the matter in KAnt.s judgments, namely, his conception. 
of predicate and sub3eot. Vlbat 18 a conception tor Kant? The 
answer to this question can be broken down into an analysis ot 
Kant's own words, a unified desor1pt1on of Kant's oonoept1on, 
r F F F 
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and a consequence which lssues from bis view of what a oonoeptlo~ 
is. 
Before viewing Kant's Ideas, the reader might erect a 
background of quest10ns asainst whioh to cont~ast Knnt's state-
ments. E,7£mples of such questions Jnight be these. ·'Is Kant· 
here desoribing the intelligible quiddtty of the thing?" "Is he 
confusing the unlver.'sal concept und the sc:n.matie phantasm?" 
"Is be emphasizing intelleotual content in a oonoeption?" 
F1rst, then, to present a patoh.llke description of 
ooncept1ons wInch Kant otters in01dental11 durlng his Introduc-
tion to the Crtt1g,ue. He says that explicattve 3udgment.a 
onlY' a.nalyze 1t the liubJeot] 1nto ita oonstltuan1i oon-
oeptions, whioh were thought already in the subJeot, 
although 1n a oonfused manner.15 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I can aognize befottehand by analy-sis the conception ot' 
bod,. through the oharacteristios 0.1' extension, 1apene-
trabl11ty. ,hape, etc., all whlch are oogitated 1n this 
oonoeption.1.6 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • if we take away by degrees from our oonoeptions of a 
body all that can be reterl'ed to mere sensuous expex-lenoe-.. 
oolour f hardness or softness, \velght, even iapenetrabl11 t,..-
the bOd,. will then vanish; but the spaoe Which it oooup1ed 
stl11 remains, and this 1t is utterly tmposslble to anni-
hilate 1n thought. 1V 
Soma of the anSWel'S to the questions used as a x-sierenee baok-
, 'I LId 
15 Kant, Qrit&sue, 30. 
16 tbid. 31. 
17 Ibld. 27. 
ground may already be taking shape in the reader's mind. 1!o make 
1them clearer, 1"ete1"Gnoe will now be made to Kant's LoS1k, lince 
it 1s generally agreed that Kant maintained the ideas of' tradi-
tional logio d\U'"ing his Cl"itlgue.16 
Kant saJs a oonoept 1s a~eR1"eaent,a,tl0 Eer notal 
mal~ O£Mmunes.19 "The aggregation of co-ordinate attributes 
~erkma,~ constitutes the totality of the conoept.n20 
'rheretol'a a oonoept tor FAnt 1.s a group of _rlonale. 
F 
~~t 1s a mer~le? It 1.s translated as representutiotl# attri-
bute, note, aba mark. though this leaves the question wh$t~r 1.t 
1s 1ntel11gible or aensible or both, undetermined. These .rls-
male, "hioh were "ab'eady thought into a sub3ect," were consider-
ed aooording to the 10g1c of Kant's time to be d1vlded into two 
gttoupsl (l)!.S. essentlam t2srt1aanti4 which inoluded certain 
ptt!m1tive and constitutive marks (ssa~,nt1~11a). as well as 
attributes. whioh had their sUffioient ground in the essenoe and 
were derivative from it, and (2) tbe ext~a eaaent1a*l~, which in-
cluded all other marks, whethe:r modes or relations. since both 
wera not der1vative from the s •• enoe. Thus, it the essence were 
18 Ct. Smith, CQmmdntarz. 34, and Paton, Kan". Meta-
2Slsio !! !!2er1enoe, 187.t§6. 
19 Immanuel Kant, Kant's ~!fk" in Iran"," lJerk!. 
ed. G., HartensteIn, LeIpzig, iaaal, ., as. 
20 Io&d. 93. 
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pt'Gsen'. the attributes bad to be present, but this Wat no1; true 
for the modes and :relat1ona.21 b taoti t:b.t1t rolations weI'S no' 
)lecesstU'fl17 pl' ••• nt ,'111 b$ or so_ importance later on.22 
Kant d1vides conoepts 1nto omp1r1oa.l and 1ntolleotual. 
concepts. :.t'he empirioal ooncepts tU.-G not definitions. Kant Q.Jt-
empl1fle. th1s in thG 'p'r~tl9.\\. with the ooncept at' water. ni'ha 
"ord [Water]. with th€l tew marlUJ attached to tt, 18 more propes:-
e. de81gna tioD than a oonception of the thlna. tt25 rus 1a the 
Sobolastl0 ftdeaorlptlYG t'h)tlnlt1on." 
Tbe tntelleotual conoepts are also indetinable. Qp. 
<!lnarl11 fJheao at-a 1iho oategories, suoh u substanoe or oause, 
but .em_times non .. mpl.rlclll oO).1ceptl 11ko t'tlt;nesa" .. tt2J'lshti.ft 
KAnt t a emplr10al and intelleotual ooooep'8 41"0 not 
defin1tion., ~+i) not oomplete quiddi t1es, sinoe, .eco:ralns '0 
Kant. the dGf'ln1t1on e~eaSG. thc.'f oomplete representatlon of thl 
thins, the enti1'e qu1dd1t,.. But he p1"GtOl'. to oall h1loonoepta 
s~t,&OIl O~ !amB~&~1.0lla of the thlns.24 
Do theSG e!R2~&t~o!S GXp1'eIS even a pa~t1&l qu1ddlv., 
of the thIns? Kant s1f'Jply does not emphasize the undcu.'.'andlng" 
ea or. pas •• 87-88 of the pt'cu'Ient tiheala. 
23 Kant, C,Jt1t&:a •• 417. 
24 lb&d. 
apprehension of what a thing ls. B1s empirical conoept may imp 
some quiddity, but 1t 18 not a quiddity of the thing known, es_ 
pecially wben Kant oalls it ua rule by which my imagination oan 
delineate an image."25 The empirical ooncept 1s oompounded with 
an ~ 21"101"1 element, but if this enriches the concept with any 
mea.ning, it 1£1 meaning sprung from the understanding, not from 
things. 
Regarding his intellectual oonoepts, Kant's terminol-
oS1 1& too oonfused to allow an unqualified statement. His 
6a8111 di.cernible twofold use of eateg0tl--sometlmes as a uni-
fying form, and at other times as the matter or oontent of 
thought26_-necess1tates a distinction. In so far as Kant uses 
the intellectual conoept as a synthesizing form it does not ex-
press a.ny quiddity. In BO far as be usee it to indioate oontent. 
than there mal be a quiddity p~esent, but 1t cannot be oalled a 
quiddity of the 'ihtnS known, Since "the pure oono.ept is suoh tbaiJ 
it 1s not d1-8.1In tram experienoe, but springs from reason in re-
gard to 1ts oontent."2' 
In summary, therefore, Kant.s oonoepts are not quid. 
di ties or the thing. What are they then? The pure conoept haa 
25 Ibid. 119. 
26 This discrepanoy was observed by Uberweg, History 
~ Ph1*osoRSl. II, 164. 
27 Kant, LoSlk, 89 
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just been defined. 11le empu-lcal concept 18 G. compound of both 
sensible und lntell1g1ble obaracteS'1stloa, tWlalt>. wl~ tbe 
uoent .tallinG Mav11J on the t~ 01' tho two element.. 'l'h18 
a.naistic emphal18 1n the 01UP1x'1enJ. ooncept; 18 bx-oUih' Quia 01 ..... 
11 by atud'11ng 'the _nner in whioh &lnt t}.bltl~W an empuloa) 
oonGeP',He d ••• ~1be. the concelvins ot " .. e." 
I ••• a apru,o., a lime, and u willw. I •• them, 
~d 0. ba$l'Ye that they dltr,£ t'l!U, tme ano .... It . regardl 
U.:i:le sue, .hape! and so one, ot tb.e11' 1irunk. theD 
uMolwa, thea· ea.,. ••. I HPi·i. on what thi:r _n in 
cODlOn, tua._17, t;wnk, 'Ox-ana S I and leawa. ADd X 
•• i; .fi"om $ftX7'tb.1ng 1n which the aeen obj&ot. dUte. ~B'I~ , anot_,.., In thia 'war I obtudn a concept of 
ft~ ••• G 
A "'0 .t;,..1k1ns eample of emphasizing the GcMmati. phantaall 
!.Dstead of goUg on to the In'ell1g1ble IWnnlng is found ttl 
~n"a oonception of "dog," 
The concept of "dOl" a1Sn11~1.1 lbedeute"il a :rule aooord1 .. na 
15o '.tllch ., 1mt.atnatloa oan delineAte ,on.tx-allJ' t4:le eb&pe 
of a oerlln1n toutt-toO'" Qnimal withou.t '001111 lJld,te4 
61-.. to so_ speOlal. ind1v1dual shape oft ... " _ .~ 
. '18no. a. to 1R7 po.sible lndlvldual tma&e which I oon.~' 
Ja. '198°111',2.29 
lI'ow "bil. ,1,; 1s tl'Wl that ... universal oonoep'ofaog does haw 
a nOOes8lU'1 rate1"el1Ce to so_ sob_ • .-td,e phanwaam tel' 1', spoos.-
.t1oat1oD, 81no& 1ihe 8p$ol!'lc dt1'fel'onoe or dOS .soapes ,he hl.a18D 
I I '1.n r nr 
28 "bl"1.- 92. (unde1'800l:'lng tl:dde4.) 
29 Kant .0K1!JalI!., 119. Tb18 dootl'1ne 1. elaboltated 
wlt;b. Groat.,. d.'a1i til !£&e'"""'.tiauaootldentnl Deduo't1on aDd tbe 
So_mat Ism ot tho Oategorle •• 
01 
1n'61100t. n~vev'bolesa, Kan~ neither stressel nor even men~1oal 
the in'bolllalble nat_e of doS. lien,-80ft., Q oonceptwhloh "_ana 
a rule aocopd1ns to wb1eh mu imagination cun delineate the shapo· 
U not a conoep' of what ados 18. It _,. be a guide to the 
phantasm. n 18 00' an nl')~h&nsion ot tho aatee or doe_ nu' 
1t »IAat be ".e •• o1'oo tl:lat even 1n COl1oeptus 11ke "dOSD Qnd It" .... 
there SN, aooord1ng to l{an'b, the p\C"O !. i~~'I£' el.-uta IUGh u 
81.lbstanoe and space. 
~ oonfUsion \'Jhl.ch l:'08\111;8 fraul wU.rlS sueh Gono.pt. 
as '*bodJ'ft in sU'pl)oseCSl1 sOientific pztopoalt1t1IUI beeamea a.tdeQt. 
one ppecU.oato 1s oonsWered 1q)1101t in Q subje.t because t, btl. 
al.wql 'been associate. with that group or .r~ in .enae ox-
perl.Doe. i'hus tb1a •• natam in Kant's conoeji.rt10,ne obs$u.'I.'el aad 
Qontua.s h1s division of Jud~Dta. 
Ano1#hel' Nault ot this ovel:' .. ~a1z1nG ot tbe len .. 
ol:larao1el'1at'101 in conoeptions 1s that the attention o!~ one (U)n-
sid.ring thas e ooneeptlops 18 attraoiod to tho lot111t10na1 vlsw 
of the sonse data, th.1r plo'~eeotrbGn'. ftthor tlmrt '0 ,_ 
subtle 1rrliellig1ble mean1xlG 1nvolvo4. Tb1a lead. 'o~t Id.sht 
be ,~ ttpl.o'~ logic," whe~ aUG oonoep' 1, conoel,," u 
belns 1.;",1101' in the aubJeo'b-oonoept it the tOl'ltDl' 1s l_al17 
ooino.fAent w1'h tb.e phanttasm or the subjeoa-oonoept. Dee' Kant 
tall 1nt;o this dUtloultyt The !tGQi'ht!' _,. incllne to a 'entat1.,.. 
de01s10n -hlle r.Qd1n~ the tollowing ••• ds .t Ian'. 
Eithe~ the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as son~­
what which is contained (though oove1't17) in the concep-
tlon AI or the predioate B 11es completely out of the 
oonoeption A, although 1t stands in oonneotion with it. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • It I go out of and beyond the conoeption A, in order to 
recognise ano~er B as Q8nneoted with It, What foundat1on 
have I to rest on • • .3 
Kant seems to be arranging picture-oonoepts. At least he is 
conoentrat1ng on their sense character instead of the~ intel-
ligible meaning. 
What Kant's conception 1s, and hoVi it 1£1 formed have 
been explained. There 1"e_1na f however, anothoxe sauro. of 
subJeotivism in Kan1ifs diviSion ot judgJl1ents. This 1s the nora 
acoording to whioh Kant considers certain marks as implied 1n a 
ooncept ant! ethel'S as extrinsio to it. R1s norm al'bitrarlly 
includes some sensible ollaroacter1st1os and absolute attrIbutes, 
although it exoludes other equally frequent sensible characte~­
istioo and all relations. 
Kant's ooncept or "body in general" exemplIfies his 
adheSion to certain sen$1ble notes as "analyt1e.n and h1a 
rejeot1on o.r another beoause he cla1ms it is synthetlo. 
I j 
I can oognize beforehand by analys1s the oonoept1on or 
bod7 tbroueh the oharaoteristios of extension, U1pGne. 
trabi11ty, shape. eto., all whioh are oogitated in this 
oonoeption. But now I extend 't1tI' knowledge, and looldng 
baok on experienoe from which I had derived th1s oon-
oeption of' bod,.., I .rind-weight at all times oonneoted 
30 Ibid. 30-31. 
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with the above characteristics. and the:vefore I S,nthgti-
cally add to ~ oonoeptions this as a predicate • • • 1 
FOur things whioh Kant says 1n the passage just quoted are (l) 
that weigh' is a note added on synthet1callT. (2) that 1n ex-
perience we1ght 1s seen to be oonnected with otbBr oharaote:z.-.. 
lsttas that ar& analrt1cal. (3) that extension, impenetrabilltr. 
and shape are cogitated 1p the conception snd are analytioal, 
and (4) that this previous oonoeption VIas derived .t'l'om exper-
1enQ •• 
Kant efters no reason why some of these empirically-
dlscovered oharaoteristics of a bodY" are analytical while weightt 
ls srnthetloal. \'¥h7 d ges he choose to draw the 11ne between 
shape and weight? Is shape oontainea more ~adloal17 than we1gb' 
1n the conoep1i ot bodJ'. Perhaps. Yet this oannot be pl'oved b7 
the dogmatic at£1vmatlon that up to a certain point the oonoep~ 
is analytioal, but anything be'1ond it is s1nthetleal. Kamts 
noI'm app.ars arbItrary. 52 
1 I I It. 1 
31 Ibid. 
8'1 
A note about this t1~st example leads loglcallr lnto 
t~eat1ng tne seoond arblt~ary manner or torm1ng ~e 8ubJeot-
concept. It should be noted tbat When Kant oODsldera 1mpene. 
trabl11t,- aa Sap)'lo!t in th& concept of body. he views it as an 
abaol.,s .. t'~'but., not as a 3Jtola..tlon Ol' relative pOWEr or aot-
lns.33TbJ.a very attr1bute is Q good example ot Xtult'a arblt;x-a-
, 
rirless 8inoe he make. lmpenet1"abl11t1 anal,.1;ioal, and thel'etox-e. 
WllYet'aal and n •••• ,uU'7, without re,8.2:"4 to the tacts of ex.pel'l-
.lM.. ~s vle. of lJ1Penetl'ab111t:r as an alulolllte attrib._ 1. 
to be expeoted alnee bnti, 1;le4 down by b1s atat1., essential-
lst10 war Of concelving thlnsa,36 thought that ft. oenoept must, 
in 1tll oonnotatlon" be an abstraotod e:ttr1bll1; •••• Relational 
thinking a.nd the oonoept. ot relation a1'e 19no:t"84.-3& Slno. 
attribute. hay. 1;heU suttioient reason in tbe e.seno. of the 
thins, the,. can be analyzed in that oonoep' 1t8elf. But alno. 
the aut.t101eJlt reason for a :relation cannot 'be found 1n the 
oonoept. ae1thar- can the relation be artalyae4 there.Se-
An instane. ot 'this ol1nginS to on17 absolute ootUltltu-
enil attl'lbute. 000 __ in Kant's Introduotion w}:IIl".·. he ,a,,: 
•• 
33 Ct. "Von del" tal.chen Sp1tst1ndigkelt der Vler 
Syl1og1stlohen t'iglUten,tt Kantl'. FIe"., II, 65-66. 
34 Ct. Gl1eon, Bel~ !-!J~_ ~_~ ~lo~~1?~~.s., 120. 
35 Smith, 0l!!!niuarz, 181. 





In the oon.eptlop of $o£!t91n~ that lreD!, lind ••• 
think an existence whIo a cer,aln t anlaoedea, and 
!'rom this I can d8:r.wlve analytioal Juds-nta. Bu.t thB 
oonoeption of a cauae l1es quit. out ot tbe ahove cop. 
oept1on arid indioate. some'khios ent~e17 different from 
tthat whioh UPpeDS!:' and is consequent17 not contalne4 
in that eonceptlon.~' 
~h$ oon.eption, "that Wbioh happens,- slnoe It implies onl1 
absolute attributes oanno", contain an easenilal relation to tha~ 
whi. c9.U$ed 1t to happen. ~ exolu8'1on or essential •• latlone 
in the subject Jd.ght ba'fe oau.ed an $.ll1U81ng speotaOl$ bad Kant. II 
(lon'eapol'ul •• om"tl1enge<l b1a to elassity the t,llowing judgment; 
e.s either analJ'1i10 or s"nthet1e J oh11drc;u;1 at'e tbe ott.prinS of 
parents. The proposition 1s unl".raal. ana 080818&1"7_ b _an-
las of Offspring 11 a'baol",. in so tar as 1t 1ndlo&t.. tbe su'b-
je.t of senera'ion. but it 18 a180 8.sent14117 l.'elat1ve 1n 80 
tu a. s.- neofuulU'l17 1Ilpl1es the sen.el'atOl'a. 0h11dJ*.n, oons1d. 
erea as suoh, are an .~1. t4 •••• nt1&117 relative 'being' 
(l'~latlY~). Butltani 'b7.paa •• s the po.s1bll1ty of such belng., 
in hold1ng that beinS can and shou.14 be 00ll()eive4 only aa 
a1:ulolute. static pel".reetion.38 
Th18 .'bud,. of the nO%"'m used b7 Kal11i in QcbdttinS ErJ5-
!!1~ into concepta .has brought out t~ taot that 'his h~ wal 
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• arbitral',. both with regard to certain sensible charaote%'ist1ca 
and with resard to relat10ns. 
The limits of this thesis do not allow a thorough 
e7..aminat1on into the nat.e of KAnt's judgments considered aa 
ooaplet. wholes. lIowever. the evldene. a'l.r>ea.ay seen in the in-
vestigatlon o~ the natve of' Kant.a judgments aoooltding to their 
constitutive part. of oopula and oonceptions seems '0 substan-
tiate the 1'011 ... 1ng SUl'.lll1tlr7 vl.... Kant does not habituall,. 
oonsider Juds-at &8 an 8aentlally spiritual operation. He d ••• 
not eJltH~'" into the question wh7 men neoeauul)'l11 make Juds-nt8 
1n oomlug to know 'bhinss. R1a knowledge about the .fU.nda.mental 
natue and oallSes of J\ldpem appear. neither yeV1 aecuratHI nol' 
pl'otound. 
1'beretOl'e. in sUlJaDing up this st\l4;r of' Kant'. pt-emt •• 
that the predi.ate's Jlon-t,n.lus1on 1n the sUbJeot.eonoep1; '* the 
nON of a 8J'Q.thetlo judgment, tl'Ve oauso. should be h1shUg'h~o4 
as vltlat1n,g Kant.s dlvls10n ot judgaaant.. ~G7 W01"$ xant" 
tailu.tt. (1) to 1'eoon011o in his division both tN.l varlo1;,. in 
_nts apprehensions or the oonne.ting link between, S. and P. and 
the obJect1 •• taot, indepe!ld.nt; of a huDlan knowel'. of .. neoes.-
u,._ contingent oonneot,lotlJ (2) to eatabllah a n01'Jl to. de-
"'eX'll1Jllns the adm.$.1on of not.s into a oonoept1,oJl' (3) t. 
emphasize the qu1ddltrot the understood ooncep1iJ (4) to oon.ide%' 
the 1mpl1eatlou of ne •••• a~,. x-elatlona in e.sentlallJ relative 
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belnss, (5) to grasp accurately and profoundlY the natu.e ana 
neoess1q- ot h~ judgments, whioh were the matter that Kant 
undertook to div1de. 
Tho validity of Kant.s premise on tbe diviSion oE judg. 
lJl$ntu, has been examined and 11;s weakness exposed. NOW it, tOl' 
tho aake of arguaentJ, 11; w.~. conoeded, not gran1icH3. thai; this 
prel'd.s$ were valid, liQuid Kant 'a argument tor the extstence of 
sJUthatt.o jUdgJ1_n"bs!. 23:'ieI& aotuaU1 prove' The existenoeot 
s,uthe":1.c 3udgments m1ght be estab11sbed solldl,. enough. Bu' 
whether those 3udpents would 'be also .l m:~o~' in Kant'. sen •• 
would depend on th1l stpength of Kant IS oth.er pramse.. Row 
,1;"00. are these pl1eJa1se. by the_elves. apat't from 1;he :f1aws 
d1soovere4 1n BAn,'. dlvis:1.on of 3udgmentt 
~hou.gb the l.bl1ts of thls thesls do net pe:t!dt all 
InvEulf;1ga.tlon of how strong eaoh of the tour remainIng preld.aea 
mar be. nevertb81esl it seoma wise to sbow the weakness of 7e~ 
. 
anouh$l' KantianpJ'6I1d.se. Thel"efOl'G. the moat .fundameJltJal prem-
1.8 1 •• he ••• tor exaudna1l1on. Th1a Pl'eJd.ae 1s lQ;.u:at'a vie. 
that hi. tfOoper1l1oan Revolut1on" 18 a luatlf'1a.'ble bfpothella. 
:ftle oaue leading Kant to foranulate 'h1s v1_ 1'Ias one 
of the gen.~al Oause. tbe.' led hi. to .'&1'" his o!'1tJ.cal study. 
Whr had _taphJ1tl0. oome '0 a stand'id.ll? WbJ 'fIas " so •• 11' .. 
contradiot_,.., '1b7 had it net found the a_e pe.:tIh Of scienee' 
Kant arsued c~o'l,. to so_ .t'\maaaen1ull Jd.atake, and then 1.\'.,. 
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amon, other possibillties he ohose ~o slngle ou~ as the oulprlt 
the tJ.'aditlona1 doot%'ine of tl:ul mind'. oonfol'm1ty to things. 
Betare an examination of the reasonableness or th1' 
choloe, attention should be cs.lled to one ot Kant's fo.tlle'e • 
• here he sa, •• 
In this PJreta.. I 1;ros.1; the new _tapbi's1oal _thed as 
a J:o"pothesls with the y1 •• of rendering appaJ.'ent th. 
tbst attempt. at suoh a change of _thod, whlch ue 
~.a:r. bJ'pOifu.. et10a1. BUt in "he CP~lp 1"8.1t lt lJihe Dew ._aplqaloal metho4J wllt . elaOna'rated, 
net·lqpethttlcalll, but apodelotloal17 ••• 39 
In thi. note Kant wlshes "0 .. ast.Q:te bts read.,... tbat although the 
fust step in the 0EI'Mu. 18 onl,. lQ'pothetllal. this should not 
.aWl. the reader to he'ltate, since 1at;er on the corre.tnea. ot 
tb1s ft.st step w111 be proved. This proof oocurs 1n tibe 
0p,~tliU. it.ell when the sirlking taol11t1 which this hJ'potheala 
po.se.... tor cutting the knot. of all .-taphrslcal anttnomie. 
18 di.pl.,ed.40 a.\ l' .hould be rememb.~e. that .. ~. eaae 1n 
solving an'lnomies 1s not an intrtnaio ~~nt tor the t~u~ of 
an h1'Pothes1a. 
Roweyer, this note does not mean that Kant •• ar~n .. 
tatioD 1s eve. independ.nt of this starting DJpotheal.. It i. 
always the neces.a.ry condition fot' eJd..&lting !. 21'11E& knowledg.41 
• 1 
39 Kant, ,qr&'&g:e, 14. 
40 Kant, Q,ritlii!, 311-312, 311-521. 
41 Paton, &sa"! ,,'apbl.d .c JJJ. aerleno,., "I8~ 
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and the T1'anacendental Aesthetlc and Anal,.tic rest on ex1.'lna 
~ 2rlo~& knowledge_ A. a ~esult Of this initial bJpothea1 •• 
one th1ng CaD be aeen alfeoting tbe entire Kantlan sr.te~ I' 
tl that the Karl1;Un ph11oloph7 in all lts ramif1oation. po •• 
sease. no ~e.'e~ ya1141t1 281' !l than this starting point. 
The _thod ot s tud71ng th1s .t'UJldaJl$ntal pram1 .. 8 ot 
knt wl11 cODsl.t; in presentlng and c01l'lU1Gntlng on the aal1e111; 
palsages in wh10h 1t.aXltl poalts b.1a Oopernioan Revolut10n. 
In the fDa'i of tlul •• passages Kant sa781 
It appears to me that the example. of _t~_tl0' ahCl 
nat1.unl1 ph11osop1l7 ••• al'e auttlclentll reJllU'kable 
••• to lnduoe WI to aa1ce the expex-iJlent ot 1JI11Ult1nS 
them, so tar as t:t. analog whioh, as rational selenee •• 
tber be .. to .. 'apbJslc. mar permit_'S 
Two questions artIe upon ex.aa1nlng this text. F1rat. al'e tblt 
examples of _the_tile. and nat_al ph11osopbJ' aotual17 sutts.-
clout (and' not mere17 appal'entJl1 so) to 3ustif1 the expet'iaen' 
1'aJa' proposes' bat sara th$,. appear sUffioient I and ,.8t tbe 
pl'eoed!ng h1ato"s.o akebob •• he haa given of the al1esed17 sudden 
atsltts 1n the other aoleno.a al's not •• t down aa 801entltlG data 
nor arranged to eft •• t a demonatx-ation fro. proved ~'orl. 
taeta. 
Despite th1a inoonolusive appeal to hist __ ,.. however, 
there -7 have been sUffioient reason to bdtate the ot_. 
lJ1 I •• 
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solenee., provided oare was taken to avold 1n1tial erl'CW8 aM 
to be sure that ~ 1m1tatlon a1w&7s proceed reasonablr. 
The seoond qUestion 18, how tar doe. the analogJ ot 
the other lWatlonal IUll.noes to m.etapu,sloa alloW ot an attempt 
a1; 1rA1tatlng the., 'l'hel use }qpothe'... Can _tapl:q'slo8 dO 
11kewi •• ' Yes, 'but onl,. in a s1m118l.*11 l1ra1te4 UEUiI.. Sino. 
the aatve of aa hJ'pothes!s 1s suoh a8 to glY$ '07 itselt onll 
pl'oba'ble know).edge. and s inoe tb1s caD 'Oeeo.. the (uar'ain knowl-
edge propel" to 8cleDoe 0017 bJ' em.plo71ng 80me oer1;&1n Pl'Uloiplea 
to dellOws'bt-ate tllat the lQ'pothGsia 1n qustlon 18 th$ unique 
posslble explanation." " tollowa tbat 'he leglt1Jaate Wle ot 
~ bfpotheaia ~t be to d ••• lop those certain prino1ples 
whioh the .81ent1at atready holds. Tbus. 1t 11.1 not 1101t \0 
make an l'q'pothEut18 about t1l'st principles. Surelr the mnd'. 
relation to the thins known ls a tirst pl'1holple in the aot ot 
knowing. It 1s l'eoegnlsed 1mpllcltl,. in the aot of knowins. 
Ell'ld 1s a tirst prinoiple in the metaphJslca of cognition. o em-
sequentlJ. in to1'1tl1ng a bJpothesla about this relation, ltaatJ 
has exceeded the 111n1ted area in whicb. alone the h1'Pothetlcal 
III 
43 St. ~mal, 1_ T. j I, 32, 1, ad 2, exemplifIes 
this lD adducing the geocent~:rc hypotheSis and noting, oenturies 
bet.)!'. OopettnlcWI, its ess8nt1al \Vealmeaa. "Siout in astl'elogia 
ponltUl' 1'at10 exoentricol'. _, ep1cyolol'um ex hoo quod, ha. 
positione facta, possunt salva!'! apparentla sensibilia c~oa 
aotus oaeleate., non tamen ratIo haec est auttlclente~ probans, 
qu.I. e1;lam terti. a118. posItion. taota aalvari poasent.-
reason. 
But Kant sal's, 1IIt has hltherto baen assUDl6d that ... 
cognitions ItWJt oontorm to the objeota."44 Have all Kant'. 
p1'edeoessor. made this asaum,pt1ontSll1th, while admitting tMe 
"assumption did aotually underlie one and all pre-Kant1an ph1-
loaophie8,- notes tbat U .. , Maleol'8.nob.e, and Lelbnltz had 
pe.x-tial.l'r antloipated Kant's .,vtl 1'8"01'88.1 of 11; •• 6 
I IAQt olaaa1:f:tes thb waiSt tlonal doet1'1ne that OlUt 
oognitions ItUSt oontOl'JJl to the objecta known as an aaaumptlon. 
Was th1s ' ... eh1ng aasUllfltd, tak,en to'1/! gttanite41 1'0, at leut not 
in tbe aocepted aena. at "a'8'UDlPtlon." Ord1nu1 men have 
abundanit evldenoe for this ooot1'18$, jut as the,- haYe abundant 
evidenoe that tire bw.'ns wood and not v&~~ I.er!u:" tof! ~ t."..e 
o! treque.t experien.. o~18 tn.. to __ this 3udtPl'nt whioh.. 
lo_one I'd.ght 1008817 dub as an 1IaS81.Ul\Ptl0D.- TIM tina's .on .... 
formit1 to the thlng 18 a taot that 18 immedlatel,. evtden'b to 
reflective alnd. tbat are ru)t busee! '07 aultjeotlv1st10 doubiul. 
More«ex-" philosophers, p:rob1ng 1ni;o tbis baa" prb-
clple ot the knowing P1'oo ••• , have ana17Hc1 1t and shown it to 
lJe a ft'J:'7 wel.l-founded "assumpt1on. - For example, st. Tho .. _ 
'" Itan •• C:rlty_, 1.2. 
45 Smith, 0fll!1!S'a.x-X. 21. 
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Aqulnas prooeeds ~om the evident d1atinction between the kn.w.~ 
and the thing known. Then he 81mp17 X'a1sea the familial' daU,. 
experleDoe or "IfY$ sot 1t," O~ "Oatoh on?" to a philosophioal 
level bJ a1ia.ttng thai; somehow the tshins known 18 1n the knoweX', 
that some union has 'been atteoted bet1fMD the tViO. Blat this 
union oan onl,. be aohieved 'b7 the ,\to having something 1n COJAtnOrl, 
b1 a sharing 1Jl some "tON, ttb7 sOSIle"oontol'mit;l." as th$ 
soholutl08 lUi,., and since the knower was prevlous17 wlthou'll 
this t.. (fer o1i1l.erwbe h8 would al1'8ad;y haVe b$en knowing tbe 
ob,eot;). b.e could onl,. have 1'80$1.,.4 'h1s t.oft1 trOll 1Ihe thins 
known, thl-ougb. lts $%pel'1eno&4 aotion tQ?on h1a in. a.Gordan •• 
w1 tih the law tba t S-' ~se,n,tf. eai ! !1'U .a:a&l~. 
Bow 'basides the welght or unlTal's.l , •• ttmon7 and tbe 
studied approval of eOllP8tent phllosophel'S, this 80.0alled 
ff·us\111lPtion" preset'"..,d _1'1 fa thinking from the a'bsU1'<1!:t7 of a 
pre.established ~tJ1 In all 1ntelleo's •. fttl' strange thingl 
would have been noticed 1t objeot;s had to conform to our huaaan 
oogh! tion. Were this t;he e .. fle. Kaat m,lgb:t e .. al1y haft 418. 
cavered the following nonsena •• 
Each and •• eI'1 good Koen!ss'bel'ser, it po1nt.dlJ ques. 
tloned by Prot.ssw Kaat out on h1s late anemoon "t,..ell, 
would have begl'*ttdl1ngl7 admitted \hat; his be1 ... 4 01t7 .. _ 
oooupied <lurins the Seven Year War beoa,ua6 of RussU'. 1d11iHil17 








'ougb1;. Ian, would have cU.aeovel'Gd that ,_ minds or all h1a 
nolghbolf'8 ft~e ,. ooru"J'\lG'.d iiba'b '-7 au1i •• :bloall., ..,p1ied 
the l"olatloft or ca._all", 1n exae1a17 ,he .~ w..,. to ."'1J' tile 
.1JIItJ ••• _ data ~ time, pJ,aoe, J>$ople. and eYeD'.. AM all 
the •• nolsh'be. would _ftcon~d 1n __ l1*a •• ..,"10. "lid'" 
aIJ it 1t lUld been. p1armed. IV'Goth, ttf.J't one of tiM. could ••• 
'liba' illd.pqdec'lJ' or bla OWQ 'hUlk1ns, Xoeuipbe.... taU _4 
1)Mn 4 .... '17 !btl_.'" 19'. ,.- ''''4Icto pouaCJ1na ot ,. 
a •• ' • .... '111.r7 aDd ., 11v.17 c~Be 'Of BuP.t.aa.ltle_n 
wh.1. l'aDkled 80 10 ,_"" __ riel. ...llo, 1t had aot "bee. 
M!. 'bhatt 0'" oosnttlon .. , oODt .. ,. the ob$....... I' 
wa. m._. 
IAn' oont1n .. _ in bl. Pretao., "all attempt. ,. e..CJ.~ 
,un q~inl abott' tbeaa 0'0$ •• '. t.1tltEA • • • bave b ... H).\-
<2-.4 abor" .. ~7 'h1s asal.1mP'1on_" Ahtlnom1 •• "1"e. 1M"', 
pJieloat' atl4 'the.. JIIeDdeNc1 alMwt1y. ~ •• 1.nt;1t1o a;t;'._". 
Dd dM. Dd b7 if ••• 'alal1l1h-a' leal' ''QI'IIAJII~1p what 
P"ClU. mam:a •• " 'flU illLIrpa:r'·loula.l- & •• ~'10. whioh eau .. 
taM antlbOm1 •• ADd no' .'MII. u.t Jdsh.', pt,ll'bapa. ave ba_ 
panlallr M.ponttlbl.' Plold.ng out au the eulprit tb$ lto1a.1i1oa 
in tit. --1J:Is p1"' ..... , I'.Qat .Ap no'h1gs a'bout tho no ,... in 
tbat p..... Whioh ... nota.to_ t.~ ea.lns "1t:l:10u1111 ... 
, , 11_' U • 1 1.1 
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These two terms are the rna. tex-1al thing known, and the hums.n 
knower, "the lowest of intelleotual substanoes."47 
The next statement of Kant that should be oommented 
on ocours When Kant states w1thout qua11f1oation that the 
asaumption 01' hav1ng objeots necessarlly conform to our oogn1-
t10n 
appear. at all events, to acoord better with t~ 20881-
b).11tl of our ga1ning the end we have 1n view. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • When we have attained that eud, We shall then be oon-
v1noed 01' the truth of that4~h10h we began by assuming 
tor the sake of exp~riment. 
Two 001;1008 whioh Kant affirms hers are (1) that his assumption 
appears the better possible way to his end, and (2) the atta1n-
ment of this end proves the truth of his aS8tUtJ,ptlon. Several 
remarks mus t be made, 
Regard1ng the flrst notion, Kant's assumption mal 
appea1'50 to him. to be more oonduoive to his end. Be offet's no 
47 Cf. AqUinas, In II !!1., 1, nne 278.285, where 
these two $OUl'ces of d1ffio'Utt7 are oleul;y treated. 
48 KAnt_ Crlt&au$. 12. 
49 Ibla, 13-14, 
50 It should be noted that the two chief reasons b;y 
whioh Kant seeks to bolster his "Copernloan Revolution" 1n 
metaphr.Jlcs have "appeu" as their oopula instead of "is." 
These reasons are (l) the examples of the scienoes af2e~ suffi. 
clent to induce the Revolution, and (a) the metaph;YS oat Revo-
lutlon appears better suited to Kant.s end. Thus be starts the 
metaphysical Revolution. 
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solld reasons to make it appear so to his raader. But 1f hi. 
statement be oons1dered absolute17, as "It !! the bette. pO.81~ 
b1e way to mr end of scient1fic knowledge," one should note that 
the type of sc1entif10 knowledge allowed by Kant.s hypothesi. 
1s only about phenomena and oannot oonta1n affirmations or 
nO\U.n&nal value. 
Moreover, 1t could not be stated with oert1tude that 
Kant •• a:unuuptlon would E.!. the 'best way to soientific knowled,e, 
unless all the possible assumptIons have oertainly been <U.s. 
l 
1 oovered, and this one found to be oertainly superior to all. 
In 14710g the foundation for his 87_em, Kant does not tan), to 
establish these things. 
Kant'. aeoond notion, Which oan correotly be American-
ized into "It 1t works, itfs true," ultimately depends on tbe 
t~e definition ot tru'h. If truth ts cohe~eno., then lab,'. 
state_ni; lIII17 be tru, tor aome eOllP.'ent cr1tic. have attlrad 
that there are no 1'01'_1 oont~ad1otion8 1n ltant's .18tem. that 
1t is a genera1lr coherent whole.51 But 1f truth include. co-
herence but ala. demands something motte, then the consistency 
ot Kant's sTstem do •• not demonstrate 1ts truth anT more tban 
the oons18tenc1 ot Rtemann's geometry establishes th$ truth ot 
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that elaboration of ooh8~ent thought. 
The tinal words to be studied in examining the valld. 
iv" of Kant t • pre~e about inverting the knowledge-relation 
are, ftwe here propose to do just what Oopernious dld.·52 NQW 
ald Kaprla ae1Juall1 do jut Vlhat Oopernicus dldt--that is, were 
both ~e a.trono .. ~'s and the philosopher's initial thinking 
about the1&' respect1ve problems 8trlot17 parallel regattdle •• of 
the ettect. tbat tollowedf 
Ironical as 1t may seem, Kant.s "Oopernican Revolu-
tionft was not Oope~loan enough to be sCientltical17 aocurate, 
as w111 appear in the subsequent paragraphs. Copernious bad 
notioed the difficultie. 1n 8s1;rono., resulting from ptolemr'. 
geocentrio h7Pothea1a. Start1ng with the Aristotelian princi-
ple regard1nl looal mot1on, Oopern1ous argued that, "All appre-
hended obange of plaoe is due to move_at either of the observed 
obJeot or ot the cbsen •• , or to dUterenoes in move_Xlii thai; 
are oocurring simultaneous17 in both.M53 ~hua Oopernlcu. besan 
w1th Three po.sible explanations ot the evident motion. EIther 
the sun and stars alone move. or the earth alone IlOYeS, 01' both 
are moving but at difterent V6~ooltles. 
52 Kant, Cr&t1qUe, 12. 
53 This translation ot Oopernious' D-, Revolutioeib~ 
1s taken from Sm1th, Q-.ntal"I' 24. 
j 
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But Kant .. while pl'otessedly imitating Copernious, 
adduoes onll tw, possibilities to explain ths oontormtt 7 1n 
oognition w~ch 18 evident upon ~etleot1on. Be sa18, "Eltb8~. 
first, I mal assume that the conoeptions ••• oonfo~m to the 
object ••• or, seoondl,., I ma7 aS8um.e tbat t;he objeots ••• 
oonform to mr oonceptions.54 But where 1s tbe t~d possibi-
lity! Kant neither oonsiders nor adds the logioal "or, thirdly, 
I may assume that the oonoeptions oontorms 1iC) the object and 
the objeot oonto~ to the oonoeption, but under dlfterant 
aspeet •• " 
The Copernioan theory st111 rema1ns hypothetical 
today, rOll' the third possibility of a twofold IIOTe_rd; has de. 
finitely not been diaproved. S1m11~17, th& Kantlan ths0rT, 
even if the initial biPoth$sis were formulated about 1101t 
matter, v40uld st111 be on11 probable, as the thittd po.aloll.it,.. 
of a $wowway causalltJ baa not been proved impossibl.e. 
fheretOl-e, in s'WIUBarlz1ng this study of Ke.nt t • rad1-
oal twisting 01' the conformity 1n knowmg, one discove2:ta that 
his bJpothetlcal argument 1s not only solent1t1eal17 inoomplete 
tor talling to consider a third hypotbesis, but also involves 
1111c1' matter for a bJpotbs.la. Oonsequently, Kant'. argument 
tor the enstence of 81Ilthetl0 judgmen'ba !. E%l12r,1, %le.tins as 
I. 
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it doe. upon 'bbla invalid br.vothLlau and u,pon hS.a exce,u,lve17 
I,nabJeotlVG and 41'1U.t.nl"1 (l1v1a1011 of Judgments, does no' p1"cwe. 
conCLUSION 
Dw:t:1ns the <'-lvslop_ut; of this ibeau tha central line 
Of tb.o~ -7 have .en obaoUJNlld 1>7 the trequeat ch'u1ect 
afnuU ... 11hich see.d neo •• u'ftU7 tot' a thcX"ough .,tablla_h' ., 
the p)!'Oot. Con •• queml,._ 1n oloain,& 'hla Inv8st1sat1on of Kant" 
lntrodue'.., fta.ord.ns, it _,. be well to l'ov1n ,he -ill Un. ot 
the a).9~b". 
b tM11. aimed at shoWing 'bat tbe:ve 18 no Mo ••• lt, 
re t1:» .!~, to,.. in Kant, a1000 t;he oenv"al Pl'o'bl-. whJ.oh 
~ 101v8d br poaltln& Ube$e A SE&I£& t .... , p ••• uppoa •• ~e. 
1Jhat are !nvaUd. Kanu dOH bot beed the 8.D1nN,.. he lnwnto4 b$-
oaue the pJ'oblea it .. ma4. to &l1._~ doea no' owt_ 
Kant'. oC!u'ltl'al pltoblem. Watll Bow &1'0 8711'1»"0 SudS-
_DU .l alII' possible' lie amRfel'e4 b1 sayi.n8 'hat ... _ 3udB-
mordu. ~ po.sible 'bhrough!. itt~~d f .. whl0h l.aMoD .. 
Medea sJn'lwfaU of predloate aDd lub3ect. Leading up '0 kn ••• 
opqina qu •• 'lon w.~ flvo cleu atop. of reaaon1ns. 1'be.. flft 
.'epa .. pl".Id. ••• to Kant'. opening question ._"' (1) that ~1w 
l 103 
~othes1s of his "Copernloa.n Revolution" ln epistemology is 
justified. (2) thai; unlV61"sallty and neoesslty aJ:te the sign' 
of !. Pl"121'1 judgmeat' •• (3) that !. 2rlor,1 judgments exist 1n the 
solenoes, (4) tbat the o~lterlon of synthetl0 judgments 1s the 
predlcate'. non-inolusion in the subjeot •• oontent, and (5) that 
th& 801anoe. aotually oontain synthetio jud~nta ~ irlorl. 
Of thEtae tiTe pre1'l1aea the pre.en' theal. examined the moat 
important one., the fll'st and the fourth. It ahowed them hot 
strong enoup tOlupport fUrther l'eaaonlng. 
Reviewing the first pre.i..e, one reoalls that Kant'. 
J'Oopernlcan Revolution" oonslated in the hypothesi •. tbat alnce 
the dootrine Of the l'ldnd' 8 eonfol'lI1 ty to things bad nO'", avoided 
diffioult! •• in tha past, 1t was 1101t to reYerae the relation 
and have 'hing. C011tOt'm iH> the mind, Now .. bJpot.heal' b,. nature 
can on17 " used to help ~x,.teB4 s01enoet not to s1;al" 1'_ There 
can. 'llheretOl-e, ba noh,Jpothea1a about; starting principles. But 
.tn-e17 tl» III1no'. ):tela. t10n to the 'h1ng known 18 a .'baninl 
p1'lnolple 1n tM ae' of lmowinfh ?!h1a relation ls, consequent. 
11, beyond the 11m1t. allowed to a valld bJpotbeal.. Kant t • 
tlrat premiae exceeded the bounds ot pure reason. 
Beside. this initial flaw, Ran"_ Copernican Revolu-
tlon oontradioted experlenoe and trad1t10n, it led to absUl'd 
oonsequenoes when applied to real lite, and br not adatttlna 
the poss1bi11ty of a third hypothesis, it tailed to imitate 
Copernicus olosel, enough to be oalled valid reasoning. This 
~hird bJpotbea1s ora knowing process involving a mutual oausal. 
1t1 exst-fi.d b1 both th1ng and mind without ohange in the thine 
i8 emb~aoed in tbb Scholastio dootrine of abat.act1on. 
'lhe fourth prem1se was also oaretul17 .orutinlzed. 
This premi •• dealt with the norm Kant used in dividing judg-
ments. It was found tha:~ his division was ob.cfI.4'G and arb1tra17 
becaue the ju.dgments Which Kant divided were onl,- cbsovel,. 
g~asped and arbitrarily 01ass1t1ed. Ouv stud,. first examined 
the tiN of jUdgment., nlunel1, the copula, and showed from. 
Kant's own writing. and from oompetent critio. tbat .. tailed 
to diat1ngu1.h betw.en the obj •• tlve taot of a relatlon exiStins 
between sub3ect and predioate and the knowerla ap~eh.nsion ot 
th1s ltelation. Tlda tail_e to d1st.1nguish was one of the maUl 
source. o~ obscU%titr in Kant.s division of judgments. 
~n the .stud, ,1' the tourth premiae exam1.ned the 
mat~e! ot jud~DtSt oa.-1y, the conoepts 01' subjeot and p~.d­
leate. fbe ~esult was the disooyery of subjectivism aQd sens1am 
in Kant's concepta and arbitrariness in the norm. used in adld.tt-
ins not.s t. thea. concep1ua. Th1s subjectivism and arbitx-arl-
ness in both concepts and oopula. inoluding his retusal to adml' 
neoCUlsa17 relations into conoepts .1' 8slent1&117 relative belngs. 
liS a •• oond ohiet acuroe of obscurity in Kantts division ot 
l lOS 
t.rh ••• iDYaUd premis •• make tbe quoatlon baaed upon 
thea urmeoe"'8arr. oonaequen1il,. the !. il-&E& t..". neede4 ,. 
anl.er that ques1iJ.on at.-e alaounDGcossalT. 
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